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vExecutivesummary
The completion of the European energy market will help to deliver on all three of the
EuropeanUnion’senergypolicytargets–security,sustainabilityandcompetitiveness.
There has been progress, and the cross-border electricity exchanges that have
gradually developed over the last century have resulted in substantial cost savings
and security-of-supply improvements. Nevertheless, the vision needed for a truly
European energy market is lacking. A bolder blueprint is required to overcome the
physical and administrative barriers to cross-border trade in electricity. This is what
thisreportprovides.
Extendinganddeepeningtheinternalelectricitymarketisbeneﬁcial
Acomprehensivequantiﬁcationofthebeneﬁtsofagenuineinternalelectricitymarket
does not exist. However, empirical case studies and simulations suggest that
additional integration steps – such as integrating balancing and reserve markets –
promise signiﬁcant yet unexploited beneﬁts. The competition-enhancing eﬀects of
marketintegrationarealsonotyetfullyexploited.Furthermore,theinfrastructurefor
cross-borderelectricityexchangesisincreasinglyabottleneck.Thecostofusingmajor
cross-border transmission lines increased by more than 10 percent between 2012
and2013toabout€1billion.
Consequently, there are signiﬁcant beneﬁts to be had from extending the internal
electricitymarketsbyintegratingallelectricitymarketsegmentsanddeepeningitby
removingadministrativeandphysicalbarrierstocross-borderelectricityexchanges.
Beneﬁtsdependonwhointegratesandhowintegrationisorganised
We ﬁnd that the beneﬁts strongly depend on the systems’ characteristics and the
approachtakentointegration:
• First, substantial eﬃciency gains of international electricity trade can already be
reapedatlimitedlevelsofinterconnection(5percent).Asthebeneﬁtsofresolving
1the very last transmission constraints are very small, the optimal level of trans-
missioninvestmentwillnotrequireanunconstrainednetwork.
• Second, ‘shallow market integration,’ which only targets optimised usage of the
existingsystem,providessigniﬁcantlylowerbeneﬁtsthan‘deepmarketintegration,’
which allows for a reconﬁguration of the joint power plant ﬂeet including mutual
dependence.
• Third,thebeneﬁtsofmarketintegrationincreasewiththecapacityofrenewables.
If renewable electricity generation capacities are doubled from current levels the
eﬃciencies increase disproportionally. Consequently, the ambitious European
renewablestargetswilljustifygreatercross-bordertransmissioncapacity.
• Fourth,distantcountrieswithhighsharesofuncorrelatedrenewablesbeneﬁtmost
frommarketintegration.Limitingmarketintegrationtoregionswithsimilarrenew-
ablesproductionpatternsmeansmissingoutonsubstantialtradingbeneﬁts.
• Fifth,therearesigniﬁcantredistributiveeﬀectswhencountries’powerplantﬂeets
areoptimisedinanintegratedway.Thebalancebetweenconsumersandproducers
isshifted,certainpowerplantsbecomeredundantandcountriesbecomemutually
dependent.Dependingonthelevelofintegration,diﬀerentgenerationtechnologies
arepreferable.
Marketintegrationrequirespoliticalinterventionforfourreasons:
• First,electricitynetworksareanaturalmonopolythatrequirespublicintervention
toproducesociallydesirableresults.
• Second,theactionsofindividualmarketparticipantshavesigniﬁcantexternalities
thataﬀectallotherparticipants.Becausethoseexternalitiescannotbedealtwith
(internalised) by vertical integration, public intervention is necessary to achieve
sociallydesirablesectorstructures.
• Third, in EU member states very diﬀerent market arrangements have emerged.
Those arrangements are a priori largely incompatible across borders and trading
thus requires interfaces, which are highly complex because of the need to make
diﬀerentenergyproductsseamlesslytradablebetweenmorethan30incompatible
markets. The solution to this – harmonised rules – has signiﬁcant redistributive
eﬀects for market participants. Public intervention is required to strike stable
arrangements.
• Fourth,energyisastronglypoliticisedproductinallcountries.Consequently,self-
organisationofcross-bordermarketsispoliticallyconstrained.
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2Figure1:Shareofwholesalepricesinpricepaidforelectricitybyindustrialusers
inGermany
Source:BruegelbasedonIEAandEEX.
Quantifyingtheinfrastructureneed
Therearenumerousexercisesquantifyingthefutureneedforenergyinfrastructurein
Europe. The infrastructure needs they predict diﬀer markedly because the ‘optimal
network’ depends strongly on the assumptions made. These assumptions imply
societalchoices:Howarethediﬀerentobjectivesofnetworkinvestmentsweighted?
Howwillenergydemanddevelop?Whichtechnologiesdoesthemodelinclude?How
willthecostandavailabilityofthesetechnologiesdevelop?Consequently,theprocess
used to determine the ‘optimal network’ is more important than the numerical
outcomesofindividualstudies.
Marketdesignnotadaptedtothechangingenvironment
The liberalisation of electricity generation and retail businesses, and the long-term
shift in the generation structure towards variable renewables, is changing the
electricitymarketenvironment.Thevalueofelectricityismoreandmoredetermined
by factors such as capacity, ancillary services, location and ‘greenness’, which are
remuneratedthroughnationalschemes.Atthesametimethevalueofthecomponent
traded at European level – wholesale electricity and emission allowances – has
decreasedsharply(foranillustration,seeFigure1forGermany).
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more driven by national administrative choices. The EU ‘Target Model’ that should be
implementedby2014doesnotaddresstheissueofestablishingEuropeanmarkets
for capacity, ancillary services, location and ‘greenness’. Consequently, the system
underwhichtheseservicesareremuneratedwillmattermoreforaninvestor/operator
thanthelocationatwhichtheycouldbeeconomicallyprovided.
CurrentinfrastructureplanningdoesnottargetEuropeanwelfaremaximisation
MosttransmissionlineinvestmentsinEuropecontinuetobebasedonnationalplans,
that target domestic welfare maximisation or network cost minimisation, and are
fundedbydomesticnetworkusers.Thismodelfailsintheinternationalorcross-border
contextbecausebothdomesticandcross-bordertransmissionlinescausesigniﬁcant
spillovers onto neighbouring countries’ networks that are not properly addressed in
nationalplans.
As a consequence, cross-border transmission capacity has not been substantially
increasedinthepastﬁveyears.PreviousEuropeanschemeslackedthesystem-wide
overview and were either underfunded or too short-term. The European Union
infrastructure package1 is intended to deliver more cross-border electricity
transmission.Thecross-bordercost-allocationmethodthatitforeseescouldbecome
quite powerful – but for the time being is only concentrated on a limited number of
politically-selectedindividualprojects.
Overall,networkplanningcontinuestobedrivenbythetransmissionsystemoperators
(TSOs), which monopolise the information about the technical details of the energy
system, but which have incentives that are not necessarily aligned with societal
objectives. The EU infrastructure package is an extension of the current system of
national-welfarecentredregulations,asystemwhichdoesnottargettheoptimisation
oftheEUelectricitynetwork,andassuchisinconsistentwithatrulysinglemarket.
Proposal
The most straightforward European single energy market design would entail a
EuropeansystemoperatorregulatedbyasingleEuropeanregulator.Thiswouldensure
thepredictabledevelopmentofrulesfortheentireEU,signiﬁcantlyreducingregulatory
uncertainty for electricity sector investments. But such a ﬁrst-best market design is
EXECUTIVESUMMARY
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1. http://ec.europa.eu/energy/infrastructure/strategy/2020_en.htm.unlikelytobepoliticallyrealisticintheEuropeancontextforthreereasons.First,the
necessary changes compared to the current situation are substantial and would
producesigniﬁcantredistributiveeﬀects.Second,aEuropeansolutionwoulddeprive
memberstatesoftheabilitytomanagetheirenergysystemsnationally.Andthird,a
single European solution might fall short of being well-tailored to consumers’
preferences,whichdiﬀersubstantiallyacrosstheEU.
To nevertheless reap signiﬁcant beneﬁts from an integrated European electricity
market,weproposethefollowingblueprint:
1. First, we suggest adding a European system-management layer to complement
nationaloperationcentresandhelpthemtobetterexchangeinformationaboutthe
statusofthesystem,expectedchangesandplannedmodiﬁcations.Theultimate
aimshouldbetotransfertheday-to-dayresponsibilityforthesafeandeconomic
operation of the system to the European control centre. To further increase
eﬃciency,electricitypricesshouldbeallowedtodiﬀerbetweenallnetworkpoints
betweenandwithincountries.Thiswouldenablethroughputofelectricitythrough
national and international lines to be safely increased without any major
investmentsininfrastructure.
2. Second, to ensure the consistency of national network plans and to ensure that
theycontributetoprovidingtheinfrastructureforafunctioningsinglemarket,the
role of the European ten year network development plan (TYNDP) needs to be
upgraded by obliging national regulators to only approve projects planned at
Europeanlevelunlesstheycanprovethatdeviationsarebeneﬁcial.Thisboosted
role of the TYNDP would need to be underpinned by resolving the issues of
conﬂictinginterestsandinformationasymmetry.Therefore,thenetworkplanning
processshouldbeopenedtoallaﬀectedstakeholders(generators,networkowners
andoperators,consumers,residentsandothers)andenabletheEuropeanAgency
for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) to act as a welfare-maximising
referee.AnultimatepoliticaldecisionbytheEuropeanParliamentontheentireplan
will open a negotiation process around selecting alternatives and agreeing
compensation.Thisensuresthatallstakeholdershaveaninterestinguaranteeing
a certain degree of balance of interest in the earlier stages. In fact, transparent
planning, early stakeholder involvement and democratic legitimisation are well
suitedforminimisingasmuchaspossiblelocaloppositiontonewlines.
3. Third, sharing the cost of network investments in Europe is a critical issue. One
reason is that so far even the most sophisticated models have been unable to
EXECUTIVESUMMARY
5identify the individual long-term net beneﬁt in an uncertain environment. A
workablecompromisetoﬁnancenewnetworkinvestmentswouldconsistofthree
components: (i) all easily attributable cost should be levied on the responsible
party; (ii) all network users that sit at nodes that are expected to receive more
imports through a line extension should be obliged to pay a share of the line
extensioncostthroughtheirnetworkcharges;(iii)therestofthecostissocialised
toallconsumers.Suchacost-distributionschemewillinvolvesomeintra-European
redistributionfromthewell-developedcountries(infrastructure-wise)tothosethat
are catching up. However, such a scheme would perform this redistribution in a
much more eﬃcient way than the Connecting Europe Facility’s ad-hoc
disbursements to politically chosen projects, because it would provide the
infrastructurethatisreallyneeded.
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61 EUener gypolicyt ar gets:
securityofsupply,
sustainability,
competitiveness
EU energy policy strives to deliver on the ‘magic triangle’ consisting of security,
sustainability and competitiveness of energy supplies. In the context of network
infrastructure, security has two main aspects. First, Europe should have suﬃcient
infrastructuretoensurethatitcanreliablyacquireenergytomeetitsneeds.Inorder
to prevent import disruptions (in particular for natural gas) and to reduce the price-
setting power of foreign suppliers, Europe is committed to build and maintain a
diversiﬁed portfolio of physical import channels (pipelines, LNG terminals). Second,
theinternalaspectofnetworksecurityistheabilitytosafelydeliverenergytowhere
itisneeded.Intermsofelectricitythisinvolvesmainlythestabilityoftheelectricity
systemwithrespecttoindividualincidents2–butalsotheminimisationoflocalsupply
disruptions3.Fornaturalgas,internalnetworksecurityalsorequiresarobustinternal
networkthatisabletocompensateforsupplydisruptionscausedbythecutting-oﬀof
speciﬁcexternalsupplies.
Sustainabilityintermsofnetworkinfrastructureismorediﬃculttodeﬁne.Oneaspect
of sustainability is the provision of the network required for the integration of
sustainable energy sources, in particular renewables. This is a challenge because
someofthesenewlydevelopedsourceswillbeinpoorlyconnectedregions,suchas
7
2. For example, the n-1 criterion as for example deﬁned in the Network Code on Operational Security by ENTSO-E
foresees that the electricity system should be able to withstand the failure of an individual component, ie no
individualcomponentshouldcausesystemicfailureifitfails.
3. Completelypreventingsupplydisruptionsisnoteconomicallysensibleasthecostoftheback-upsystemsneeded
to achieve the target far exceed the cost of minor disruptions. National preferences for the security-versus-cost
trade-oﬀdiﬀer.wind power in northern Scotland. In addition, the intermittent nature of renewable
electricitysourcessuchassolarandwindrequiresexchangesofenergyacrosswide
areastoeﬃcientlybalanceregionalshortages.
In terms of competitiveness, network infrastructure has to maintain a trade-oﬀ.
Network infrastructure has an economic cost that has to be borne by energy
consumers. However, network infrastructure also enables cost savings by allowing
accesstothecheapestenergysources.
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82 Thecostofnon-Europe
Inaworldwithouttransactioncostsmorecentralisationalwaysincreaseseﬃciency.
Anycooperatinggroupofcountriesfacesessentiallyatrade-oﬀbetweentwoopposite
forces:theeconomiesofscalethatcanbeachievedbyenlargingthemarket,andthe
heterogeneityoftheparticipants’preferences.Economiesofscalefosterthecreation
ofeverlargermarkets,whilethecostsofmediationbetweendiﬀerentneedsprevent
unions of countries from growing too large. The larger the number or the more
heterogeneous the countries’ preferences, the more likely it is that the transaction
costsofmediationoutweighthebeneﬁtsachievablethroughtheintegratedmarket4
This also holds for the energy sector, in which preferences, resource allocation and
historic path dependencies have resulted in very heterogeneous energy systems.
However,eﬃcienciesfromcooperationbetweenenergysectorsaresubstantial.
Eﬃciencies arise from the cross-border coordination of the use of existing assets
(static eﬃciency), and from the cross-border coordinated development of the asset
structure(dynamiceﬃciency).Oneexampleofastaticeﬃciencyisthemonetarygain
from replacing, at a given hour, electricity produced in an expensive gas turbine on
one side of the border by electricity produced by wind turbines on the other side of
the border. Dynamic eﬃciency would arise from building only one gas turbine to
balance both systems instead of two turbines on either side of the border. In this
sectionwepresentevidenceofthebeneﬁtsofintegrationbasedonhistoricevidence,
aliteraturesurvey,asimulationexerciseandrecentdataoncross-bordertrade.
2.1Manybeneﬁtsofintegrationhavealreadybeenreaped
Europeanenergymarketintegrationisacontinuousprocessthatreachesbackalmost
acentury.Inadrywinterfollowingahotsummerin1921-22,thereductionofItalian
hydroelectricproductionwaspartlycompensatedforbyimportsfromSwitzerlandthat
were made available as France exported electricity from coal-ﬁred plants to
9
4. AltomonteandNava(2006).Switzerland5. Because of the large potential gains, cross-border electricity trade
continuedthroughouttheprotectionistinter-warperiod.
Table1:Cross-borderlinesinnorth-westEuropein1949
From/to AT BE DK FR NL NO CH
FR 1x65kV 2x60kV
1x70kV 1x70kV
1x125kV
4x150kV
IT 1x130kV 1x70kV 1x130kV
1x150kV 1x140kV
1x150kV
NL 1x220kV
SE 1x50kV 1x80kV
DE 2x220kV 1x220kV 1x110kV 1x220kV 3x110kV
9x110kV 1x150kV 1x220kV
2x220kV
Source:OEEC(1950,p.52-55)quotedbyLagendijk(2008).
Table2:Cross-borderlinesinnorth-westEuropein2011
From/to AT BE DK FR NL NO CH
FR 3x380kV 5x220kV
3x220kV 6x380kV
IT 1x220kV 1x110kV 1x110kV
1x220kV 5x220kV
3x380kV 5x380kV
NL 4x380kV
SE 2x110kV 2x110kV
2x380kV 1x220kV
4x380kV
DE 20x110kV 1x110kV 2x220kV 6x380kV 5x220kV
11x220kV 2x220kV 3x380kV 7x380kV
2x380kV 3x380kV
Source:ENTSO-EStatisticalYearbook2011.
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5. Lagendijk(2008,p39).Beforethesecondworldwar,mostlineswereintendedtopoolresourcesbyconnecting
very diﬀerent systems. One striking example was the connections between France
andSwitzerlandthatservedtobringelectricitygeneratedfromFrenchthermalplants
toSwitzerlandduringoﬀ-peakhoursinreturnforelectricityproducedinﬂexibleSwiss
hydro-plantsduringpeakhours(thesamewasdonebetweenGermanyandAustria).
Thesetransactionsallowedbothcountriestomaintaincomplementaryfuelmixesand
werecommerciallybeneﬁcialtobothsides.Duringandafterthesecondworldwar,the
energysectorsinmostEuropeancountriesbecameownedoratleastlargelycontrolled
by their respective governments6. Since the 1950s, cooperation between national
energysectorsinEurope(withinthetwopoliticalblocs)wasstrengthened7.Boththe
eastern and western blocs moved from individually controlled cross-border lines to
synchronisationoftheirrespectivesystems.Aninternationalalternate-currentsystem
requires that all power plants connected to the joint network inject power in a
synchronisedway.Inthewest,synchronisationhappenedin1957.
In 1959, the exchange of electricity, which had been strongly regulated since the
protectionistinter-warperiod,becameliberalisedallowingnationalenergycompanies
to more ﬂexibly engage in corresponding transactions. The primary target of this
removal of physical and administrative barriers more than 50 years ago was to
increase security of supply by allowing electricity imports/exports at short notice.
Signiﬁcantinvestmentsinastrongandinternationallymeshedhigh-voltagenetwork
(see Tables 1 and 2) allowed increasing electricity exchanges between countries.
Interestingly, between 1949 and 2011 the relative strength of bilateral connections
waslargelymaintainedandonlyonepreviouslyunconnectedcountry-pair(Germany-
Denmark)wasconnected.
The structure of national monopolies exchanging electricity on a bilateral basis
continued until the early 1990s. By then it became apparent that integrated
monopolieswerenotsuﬃcientlyincentivisedtocutcostsandimproveservicequality.
Intheinternationalelectricitytradeforexample,itwasbynomeansensuredthatthe
dispatch(iethedecisionabouthowmuchelectricityeachpowerplanthastoproduce)
inthejointnetworkwasminimisingcost.Eventhoughmostintegratedcompaniestried
to switch on only the cheapest plants in their respective countries in order to meet
THECOSTOFNON-EUROPE
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6. ExamplesarethenationalisationintheUKin1947andinFrancein1946,theEnergiewirtschaftsgesetzof1935
inGermanythatcreatedregionalmonopolies,andthe1946decisioninSwedentogivethestate-ownedVattenfall
amonopolyoverthenationalgrid(seeHeddenhausen,2007).
7. TheUnitedNationsEconomicCommissionforEuropeevenproposedjointownershipofhigh-voltagepower-lines
in1947,butthiswasrejectedbyEuropeanstates(Lagendijk2008,p130f).Figure2:Internationaltrade(importsplusexports)overproduction
Source:BruegelbasedonIEAElectricityInformation2001,2005,2011;Eurostat,WorldBank,Lagendijk(2008).
Note:West=Austria,Belgium,France,Luxembourg,Netherlands;East=CzechRepublic,Estonia,Hungary,Poland,
Romania,Slovakia,Slovenia;South=Greece,Italy,Portugal,Spain;North=Denmark,Finland,Norway,Sweden;
BritishIsles=UnitedKingdom,Ireland.
demand, cheaper plants in neighbouring countries often remained idle because
optimisationwasanationalmatter.
THECOSTOFNON-EUROPE
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To overcome these ineﬃciencies, the European Union initiated a major project to
liberalise and integrate the European electricity market. This project consisted of
regulating the network business and establishing competition between generators
within and between countries. As a result, electricity started to more regularly ﬂow
fromlow-costcountriestohigh-costcountries,leadingtoincreasingandmorevolatile
net trading positions (see Figure 2). At the time of writing, the European Union is
ﬁnalising this project to integrate the energy wholesale markets. The administrative
rulesthatwillcompletetheintegrationofthemarketshouldbeimplementedby2014.
Insummary,electricitymarketintegrationinEuropehasbeenacontinuousprocess
that started long before the existence of the European Union with its single marketproject,oreventheEuropeanCommunities.Thisconﬁrmsthehugebeneﬁtsofcross-
border cooperation in the electricity sector, but it also indicates that major beneﬁts
werereapedlongbeforetheEUwascreated.Thequestionwewilladdresswilltherefore
not be what the cost of non-cooperation is, but what beneﬁts can be reaped by
extendingcooperationevenfurther.
2.2Literaturesurvey
Table 3 identiﬁes the main competition and integration related beneﬁts of the single
marketforenergyintermsoftheimpactontheuseofexistingassets(‘static’)and/or
investmentdecisions(‘dynamic’).
THECOSTOFNON-EUROPE
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Figure3:Annualnetexportsbyselectedcountries
Source:BruegelbasedonIEAElectricityInformation2001,2005,2011;Eurostat,WorldBank,Lagendijk(2008).
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UKTable3:Categorisationofbeneﬁts
Static Dynamic
Competition -Reducedmark-ups -Lessinvestmentwithholding
-Improvedoperation -Improvedinvestmentdecisions
Integration -Cross-border -Cross-border
optimisationofoperation optimisationofinvestmentdecisions
-Cross-borderoptimisation
ofcompanystructures(M&A)
-betteruseoflocalresources
Source:Bruegel.
Buttheeﬀectsofcompetitionandintegrationcannotbeeasilyanalysedinisolation.
Competitionisimpossibleinsmall-scaleenergysystemsbecausetherearesigniﬁcant
eﬀectsofscaleandscopeinenergycompanies.Consequently,insmall-scalesystems
onlyoneortwocompaniesmighthaveanoptimalsize–markedlyreducingthescope
forcompetition.Ontheotherhand,integratingsystemsthatfeaturenon-marketbased
allocationofgoodsisdiﬃcultbecausethevalueoftheexchangedservicecannotbe
easilydetermined.Inwhichdirectionshouldelectricity,forexample,betradedifitis
unclear on which side of the border it is more valuable? Thus, competition and
integrationarelargelyintertwined.
Beneﬁt sfr omint egr at ion
Eﬃciencies in electricity trade can inter alia arise from the beneﬁts of exchanging
diﬀerences in resource endowments in diﬀerent countries (trading intermittent-
versus-hydro resources), the possibility to maintain more diversiﬁed portfolios of
power-plants across larger areas and the reduced need for reserves in larger zones
(thereserveneedforthermalunitsincreaseswiththesquarerootoftotalcapacity).
A number of empirical studies ﬁnd a positive relationship between integration and
productive eﬃciency. Bergman (2003), for instance, uses the creation of a single
Nordic market for electricity as a case study to illustrate that competition induces
substantialproductivityincreasesinthepowerindustry.Thisismainlysuggestedby
the increase by more than 15 percent since 1996 of the production of electricity in
Sweden,whilegenerationcapacityhasbeenslightlyreduced.Moreover,inconnection
withtherestructuringofthenetworkandretailingsegmentsoftheindustry,personnel
andothercostshavebeenheavilyreduced.
THECOSTOFNON-EUROPE
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segmentsoftheelectricitymarket:
• Gerbauletetal(2012)investigatefourscenariosofdiﬀerenttertiaryreservemarket
cooperation (currently purely nationally organised in Germany). Results point
towardsoverallsystemcostsreducedbyabout10percentinthecaseofoneuniﬁed
tertiaryreservemarketcalled‘Germalpina’(German,SwissandAustrianmarkets),
whichispreferablecomparedtoallpossiblebilateralarrangements.
•H a u c a p et al (2012) analyse the German reserve power market, which in recent
years has gone through major regulatory changes – including the better
coordination of the four sub-national markets. Haucap et al ﬁnd that the reforms
were successful in reducing minute reserve power prices8, leading to substantial
costsavingsforthetransmissionsystemoperators.
•A b b a s y etal(2009)ﬁndthatintegrationoftheDutch,NordicandGermanbalancing
markets has the potential to reduce the costs of balancing9. The total annual
balancingcostbeforebalancingmarketintegrationisabout€180millionperyear
(correspondingtonointerconnectionavailable),anddropsbelow€100millionper
year when 10 percent of interconnection capacity is available for balancing. This
meansabalancingcostreductionofabout€80millionperyear.
• MansurandWhite(2012)indicatethatemployingamorecentralisedmarketdesign
thatisonlypossibleinuniﬁedtradingareassubstantiallyimprovedoverallmarket
eﬃciency,andthattheeﬃciencygainsfarexceededimplementationcosts.Indeed,
they ﬁnd that adopting the organised regional market design produced eﬃciency
gains of over US$160 million annually, substantially exceeding the (one-time)
US$40millionimplementationcost.Theseeﬃciencygainsarisefromsupply-side
allocative eﬃciency improvements and from superior information aggregation
about congestion externalities, enabling the organised market to support greater
trade.
THECOSTOFNON-EUROPE
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8. Minutereservepower(MRP)ispoweracquiredbythesystemoperatorsfromgeneratorsandlargeconsumersto
increaseorreducepowerproduction/consumptiononagivendayatshortnotice(<15min).TwotypesofMRPhave
to be distinguished: incremental (positive) reserve power and decremental (negative) reserve power. While the
formerisusedwhenthedemandforelectricityexceedsthesupplyofelectricity,thelatterisneededwhenmore
electricityisgeneratedthanconsumed.
9. For example, when the balancing markets of two areas are integrated, negative imbalances in one area can be
oﬀsetbypositiveimbalancesinanotherareawithoutrequiringexpensivepowerplantstobeswitchedon.THECOSTOFNON-EUROPE
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Beneﬁt sfr omcompet it ion
Extendingthenationalmarkettoaninternationalmarketreducesthemarketpowerof
individual players. As Figure 4 shows, the concentration of the generation sector in
France drops drastically when it forms a joint market with its neighbours. Full
integrationcouldessentiallyleadtoanunconcentratedmarket.
Figure4:Concentrationindicatorforgenerationcompaniesfordifferentmarket
conﬁgurations
Source:Bruegelbasedoncompanies’capacitiesreportedintheir2012annualreports,andtotalcapacitiesreported
bynationalregulators.Note:thereportedHerﬁndahl-Hirschman-Index(HHI)isthesumofthesquaredmarket
sharesofallmajorelectricityproducersintheincludedcountries.InUScompetitionlaw,anHHIbelow1500
indicatesanunconcentratedmarket,anHHIbetween1500and2500indicatesamoderatelyconcentratedmarket
andanHHIabove2500indicatesahighlyconcentratedmarket.Coloursrangefromgreen(leastconcentration)to
red(greatestlevelofconcentration).
HHI=6535 HHI=5286 HHI=3904 HHI=2725
HHI=2534 HHI=1389 HHI=1132 HHI=882
Morecompetitionintheoryleadstoincreasedproductionandlowerprices,andcreates
incentivesformoreeﬃcientoperationandinvestment.Hencesocialwelfareincreases
because less market power is exercised (lower mark-ups on prices) and costs are
controlledmoreaggressively.
Zarnic(2010b)indicatesthattheprice-costmargin,whichheusesasaproxyforthe
mark-ups on the electricity price demanded by generators with market power, hasdeclined as a result of EU-wide liberalisation eﬀorts, but the mark-up applied by
incumbentﬁrmsisonaveragestillgreaterthantheoreticalmodelswouldpredictunder
eﬀectiveeconomicintegration.Theaverageprice-costmarginisestimatedatalmost
45 percent for the largest consolidated ﬁrms, but has declined due to EU-wide
liberalisation eﬀorts by about 2 percent each year since 2003 for those ﬁrms. The
resultsshowthatprice-costmarginsarenegativelyassociatedwithbetterfunctioning
ofwholesaleandretailmarkets,butbettermarketaccesshasnotledtocompetitive
market outcomes (ie mark-ups close to zero) because of prevailing market con-
centration and insuﬃcient unbundling of transmission and distribution channels.
Zarnic (2010b) suggests that an increase in market concentration of 10 percentage
pointsisequivalenttoanincreaseintheaverageprice-costmarginof0.7percent.
Several empirical studies focus on the eﬃciencies brought about by increasing
competitioninenergymarkets.Theseeﬃcienciesarerealisedmainlythroughbetter
usageofinputs,suchaslabour,andthroughsigniﬁcantcostreductions.Shanefelter
(2008) considers improvements in productive eﬃciency that can result from a
movementfromaregulatedframeworktoonethatallowsformarket-basedincentives
forindustryparticipants.Sheﬁndsthatmerchantownersofdivestedgenerationassets
employsigniﬁcantlyfewerpeople,butthatthepayrollperemployeeisnotsigniﬁcantly
diﬀerent from what workers at utility-owned plants are paid. As a result, the new
merchantownersoftheseplantshavesigniﬁcantlyloweraggregatepayrollexpenses
(-32percent).Decomposingtheeﬀectintoamerchanteﬀectandadivestitureeﬀect,
she ﬁnds that merchant ownership is the primary driver of these results. Similarly,
Fabrizio et al (2007) adopt the agency model for their study and this suggests that
ﬁrmsmaynotminimisecostsinless-competitiveorregulatedenvironments.Thestudy
ﬁndsthatthedivisionoftheutilitycompanyfacedwithcompetition,iethegenerating
sector, responded with a reduction in costs, while other sectors and companies not
faced with competition did not. The results suggest statistically and economically
signiﬁcantdeclinesininputuseassociatedwithregulatoryrestructuring.Theresults
also suggest modest medium-term eﬃciency beneﬁts from replacing regulated
monopolywithamarket-basedindustrystructure.
However this eﬃciency enhancement also aﬀects capital usage. Davis and Wolfram
(2012)arguethatthederegulationandconsolidationofnucleargeneratorsintheUS
areassociatedwitha10percentincreaseinoperatingeﬃciency,achievedprimarily
by reducing the frequency and duration of reactor outages. At average wholesale
prices,thevalueofthisincreasedeﬃciencyisapproximatelyUS$2.5billionannually
forthe103UnitedStatesnuclearreactors.Tenyearsearlier,Hiebert(2002)alsofound
evidence that plant eﬃciencies are associated with capacity utilisation of the plant
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regulatoryrestructuringactivityincertainUSstatesisassociatedwithimprovements
inplantoperatingperformance.Nevertheless,thisproductivityimprovementdoesnot
aﬀectalltypesofﬁrmsinthesameway.Zarnic(2010a)ﬁndsthatproductivitygains
ofEuropeanelectricityﬁrmsderivingfromreformsimplementedinthelastdecadeare
associatedwithhigh-productivityﬁrmsclosetothetechnologyfrontier(ieﬁrmsable
totransforminputstooutputseﬃciently),whilenosigniﬁcantimpactisfoundforthe
laggards(ieﬁrmsthatstillneedtechnologicalcatch-up).
The empirical results of the reviewed studies are summarised in Table 15 in the
Appendix.
2.3Simulation
The following simulation is not a representation of the European market but should
illustratethevalueofmarketintegrationviaastylisedexample.
Weshowthebeneﬁtsofcouplingtwomarketsbyconsideringtwoimaginarycountries,
ZoneAandZoneB,foraperiodofoneyear.Eachofthetwocountrieshasitsownsupply
and demand proﬁle. The two countries can be described by their power plant
conﬁguration,bytheproﬁleoftherenewablesfeed-in,andbytheirdemandproﬁles.
In terms of power plants we categorise the existing plants in the two countries into
four groups: (i) intermittent renewables (wind, solar), (ii) nuclear, (iii) coal and (iv)
gas. Table 4 details the data we used, and our ad-hoc assumptions on the ﬁxed and
variablecosts10
Table4:Assumptionsusedforstaticsimulation
Capacity,Zone Capacity,Zone Fixedcostin Variablecostin
A(MW) B(MW) €/MW/y €/MWh
Renewables 23,000 13,000 120,000 0
Nuclear 5,500 3,900 190,000 10
Coal 7,100 22,600 100,000 21
Gas 7,600 10,600 40,000 35
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10. Dataontheinstalledcapacityfordiﬀerentpowersources,theverticalnetworkloadandthewindandsolarfeed-
inforZoneAandZoneBcorrespondtothe8,784hoursoftheyear2012intheGermanzonesservedbyAmprion
andTenneT,respectively.Wedothisforreasonsofcompletenessandavailability.Forﬁxedandvariablecosts,we
usethevaluesreportedinDelarueetal(2011).Itshouldbenotedthatthesupplyofrenewablesandtheverticalnetworkloadarenot
constant over time, but random. We use realistic data for both (see Figure 5). Since
thetwocountriesareneighbours,thereisahighlevelofcorrelationoftheirrenewables
feed-in patterns and vertical network loads. In fact, the renewables feed-in shows a
correlation of 67 percent between the two countries. Also, the 100 hours with the
lowest renewables feed-in in Zone A coincide with 6 hours that are among the 100
hourswiththelowestrenewablesfeed-ininZoneB11.Theverticalnetworkloadisalso
highlycorrelatedat78percent,and40hoursareamongthe100hourswiththehighest
load in both countries. Most importantly, the hours with the highest residual load –
that is the load that needs to be served after all variable renewable supplies were
already used – strongly coincide. As both countries would need the remaining
resources at the same time reserve sharing between these directly neighbouring
countriesmighthavelimitedbeneﬁts.
Table5:Coincidenceofhourswithminimumrenewablesfeed-inandhourswith
maximumloadin2012forZonesAandB
top10h top50h top100h top200h correlation
Renewables(min) - 1 6 24 67%
• wind(min) 5 23 36 110 77%
• solar(min) 6 32 66 139 98%
Load(max) - 8 40 121 78%
Residualload(max) - 8 27 53 74%
We will analyse three cases. The ﬁrst is a no-trade case that consists of the optimal
schedule of the existing power plants when the two countries are isolated. In the
second case, up to ﬁve percent of the total generation capacity in the smaller zone
can be traded between zones, ie maximum transmission capacity is assumed to be
2160MW.Inthethirdcaseweassumeunlimitedtransmissioncapacitybetweenthe
twocountries12.
Installing ﬁve percent transmission capacity between the two countries allows
reducingthetotalsystemcostinthetwocountriesby0.9percent(seeTable6).This
cost saving is achieved as at some occasions more expensive plants in one country
can be replaced by imports from cheaper plants in the other country. Unlimited
transmission capacity reduces the system cost by one additional percentage point.
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11. For solar and wind energy considered separately, the number of hours that are among the 1000 hours with the
highestloadinbothcountriesis865and578,respectively.Solaralsoshowsveryhighcorrelationbetweenthetwo
countries,atalmost98percent.Windhasa76.5percentcorrelation.
12. Importedelectricityisassumedtohaveanadditionalvariablecostof€0.1/MWhThis indicates that almost half of the trading opportunities are already physically
possiblewithonlyﬁvepercenttransmissioncapacity.
Table6:Systemcostunderdifferentscenarios
Nointegration 5%transmission Fullintegration
Totalcosts 100 99.1 98.1
AvgPrice,ZoneA€/MWh 20.95 20.97 19.92
AvgPrice,ZoneB€/MWh 14.35 16.39 19.88
Source:Bruegel.
Up to this point we have considered static eﬃciency, ie the countries optimise their
generatingcostsgiventheircurrentpowerplantﬂeet.Wenowmovetoananalysisof
theeﬀectsofdynamiceﬃciency:thetwocountriesareallowedtooptimisetheirfossil
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Figure5:Graphicalrepresentationofthedata
Source:Bruegel.
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MWpower-plant ﬂeets13. Again, we consider three scenarios: no-trade, reduced
transmissioncapacity,full-trade.Weﬁndthattheeﬃcienciesoftradeincreasewhen
countriescanreconﬁguretheirplantﬂeetsfromtwoﬂeetsthatareoptimalinanational
setting to an arrangement that is optimal in a joint setting (Table 7). Given the
renewables and nuclear capacities and the load and renewables patterns in the two
countries,jointlyoptimisingtheinvestmentandoperationofthecoalandgaspower
plant ﬂeet allows the cost to be reduced by 1.1 percent if transmission capacity is
limited,andby2.5percentiftransmissioncapacityisunlimited.Figure6showsthat
intheanalysedcasethecostreductionisnotduetoareducedtotalcapacitybuttoa
shift in production technologies (more coal at limited transmission and more gas at
fullintegration)andashiftinproductionlocation(moregenerationinZoneB).Ashift
from gas capacities to coal capacities implies a shift from variable to ﬁxed cost. An
investorwouldbuildacapital-intensivecoal-ﬁredplantinsteadofagas-ﬁredplantwith
higher variable cost when the plant can be ensured to run at least 4286 hours per
year14. In Zone A the coal generation capacity that can be guaranteed to run at least
4286hoursincreaseswhenﬁvepercenttransmissioncapacitybecomeavailableas
then occasionally coal-generated electricity can be exported to Zone B where it
replaceselectricitygeneratedbygas-ﬁredplants.ThismakesmorecoalplantsinZone
A competitive. At full integration, foreign oversupply situations shifts the balance
towardsgas-ﬁredplants,asmoreoftendomesticdemandcanbemetbydomesticand
foreign baseload generation (renewables and nuclear) alone. In short, the high
correlation of both, volatile demand and volatile renewables feed-in, does not allow
for substantive reserve-sharing15 between the two countries. But a better adapted
supplyportfolioandmoreoptimalschedulingofplantsallowstotalcostsavingsupto
2.5percentinafullyintegratedmarket.
Interestingly,whenwedoubletheassumedrenewablescapacityineachcountry,the
cost-reducing eﬀect of joint optimisation increases signiﬁcantly. At full integration,
almostﬁvepercentofthetotal-systemcostcanbesavedwhenthecoalandgaspower-
plantﬂeetisnotindividuallybutjointlyoptimised.
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13. Wemodifythedatabyincreasingby10percenttheverticalnetworkloadwhenitreachesitspeakvalue.Also,we
impose a €200,000/MWh cost for every MWh of unfulﬁlled demand. This makes sure that the system has a 10
percentreservemarginatalltimes.
14. As4286hx€35/h+€40,000≈4286hx€21/h+€100,000.
15. Hereweunderestimatethereservesharingpotential,asreservesarenotonlyrequiredforbacking-uprenewables
andhigh-loadsituationsbutalsoforinsuringthesystemagainststochasticplantandlinefailures.Accordingtothe
law of large numbers, corresponding reserve needs grow less than proportionally with the system size (see
Anderson,2006).Forexample,whennineequally-sizedsystemswithareservemarginof21percentarejoined,
theresevemarginineachcountrymightbereducedbyonethirdto14percentwithoutlossofsecurityofsupply.THECOSTOFNON-EUROPE
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Table7:TotalsystemcostswithoptimalcapacitiesundercurrentandhighRES
penetration,withvaryinglevelofmarketintegration
Nointegration 5%transmission Fullintegration
Currentrenewables 100 98.9 97.5
Highrenewables 100 97.5 95.4
Source:Bruegel.
Ouranalysisprovidesalowerboundforpotentialeﬃciencygainsbecausethecostof
thetechnologyissimilarinthetwocountriesandbecausebothconsumptionandthe
renewables feed-in are highly correlated between Zones A and B. To illustrate the
Figure6:EnergysupportforZonesAandB,withoptimisationandvaryinglevelsof
trade
Source:Bruegel.
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Gasbeneﬁtsofconnectingmoredistantgeographicregions,werepeattheanalysiswitha
stylisedexamplemodelledusing2012datafromGermanyandSpain16.
Table8:Datausedforstaticsimulation
Capacity,Germany(MW) Capacity,Spain(MW)
Renewables 58,400 28,800
Nuclear 12,100 7,850
Coal 44,400 11,250
Gas 23,200 25,800
Source:Bruegelbasedondatafromwww.bmwi.deandwww.ree.es.
The two countries have quite diﬀerent renewable generation proﬁles. Table 9 shows
thatthecorrelationofrenewablesfeed-ininbothcountriesisonly18percent.Among
the 100 hours with the lowest renewables feed-in in Germany, none are among the
100 with the lowest renewables feed-in in Spain. This is mainly due to the low
correlation of wind in the two countries. By way of contrast, network load and solar
power have a much higher correlation, as is to be expected since daylight hours are
onlymarginallydelayedinSpainandalsopeak-demandhoursalmostcoincide.
Table9:Coincidenceofhourswithminimumrenewablesfeed-inandhourswith
maximumloadin2012forGermanyandSpain
top10h top50h top100h top200h correlation
Renewables(min) ---21 8 %
• wind(min) ---3 2 %
• solar(min) -1 2 2 0 5 0 8 6 %
Load(max) - 4 19 43 80%
Residualload(max) - 6 14 31 59%
ThetradingofelectricitybetweenSpainandGermanygenerateseﬃcienciesfromthe
use of existing plants amounting to 0.7 percent, lower than that generated between
ZoneAandZoneB(1.9percent),whichhaveverysimilardemandandsupplypatterns.
Thiscounter-intuitiveresult–onewouldhaveexpectedthattradingismorebeneﬁcial
between countries with less correlated demand and supply patterns – is due to the
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16. Dataontheinstalledcapacityfordiﬀerentpowersources,theverticalnetworkloadandthewindandsolarfeed-
inforGermanyandSpaincorrespondto8,724ofthe8,784hoursoftheyear2012.Forﬁxedandvariablecosts,
weusethevaluesreportedinDelarueetal(2011).substantial excess capacities in both Germany and Spain in 201217, and to the fact
that Zones A and B have quite complementary generation structures, making trade
between them particularly beneﬁcial18. Consequently, trade between two self-
suﬃcientcountriesthatmaintaintheirinitialpower-plantﬂeetprovidescomparatively
limitedbeneﬁtsintermsoftotalsystemcost.Nevertheless,integrationhassubstantial
redistributive eﬀects with electricity prices19 in Spain dropping dramatically (-17
percent) with increasing integration. Hence, Spanish consumers gain while Spanish
producersareworseoﬀ.
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17. German maximum generation capacity excluding (including) RES represents 216 percent (307 percent) of its
2012peakload.Spanishmaximumgenerationcapacity(including)RESrepresents182percent(253percent)of
its2012peakload.
18. ZoneAhas21percentrenewablescapacitywhileZoneBhas35percentrenewablescapacity.
19. Assumingafullycompetitivewholesalemarket,electricitypricescanbecalculatedastheaverageofthehourly
marginal cost. Remaining price diﬀerentials at full integration come from a €0.1/MWh penalty for imported
electricity.
Figure7:Graphicalrepresentationofthedata
Source:Bruegel.
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40,000Table10:Systemcostunderdifferentscenarios
Nointegration 5%transmission Fullintegration
Totalcosts 100 99.5 99.3
AvgPrice,Germany€/MWh 19.46 19.95 20.25
AvgPrice,Spain€/MWh 24.32 21.99 20.28
Source:Bruegel.
WhenweallowSpainandGermanytore-optimisetheirpower-plantﬂeets,weobtain
eﬃciencies similar to those we found for Zones A and B at limited transmission (1
percenttotalsystemcostsavings),andslightlylowereﬃcienciesfromfullintegration
compared to the Zone A-Zone B case (1.6 percent total system cost savings) (Figure
8).However,whenthecapacityofrenewablegenerationisdoubledinbothcountries,
thegreaterheterogeneityofGermanyandSpainresultsinsigniﬁcantlyhighertrading
eﬀects.Ifbothsystemswerefullyintegrated,systemcostwoulddropbyasmuchas
6.5 percent compared to the no-integration scenario (for the two neighbouring
countriestheseeﬃcienciesonlyamountedto4.6percent).
Table11:TotalsystemcostswithoptimalcapacitiesundercurrentandhighRES
penetration,withvaryinglevelofmarketintegration
Nointegration 5%transmission Fullintegration
Currentrenewables 100 99 98.4
Highrenewables 100 95.1 93.5
Source:Bruegel.
Our analysis provides a rough indication of the possible eﬃciency gains of diﬀerent
levelsofintegrationfordiﬀerentcountrysettings.Fourﬁndingsfromthesimulations
canbehighlighted:
• First, substantial eﬃciency gains from international electricity trade can already
be obtained at limited levels of interconnection. In general, about half of the
eﬃciency that would be achieved through full integration can be obtained when
interconnection capacity is limited to 5 percent of the smaller country’s
consumption.
• Second, eﬃciencies arising from market integration increase with the capacity of
renewables.Ifrenewable-electricitygenerationcapacitiesaredoubledfromcurrent
levels,thebeneﬁtsofintegratingcountriesincreasedisproportionally.
• Third, distant countries with high shares of uncorrelated renewables beneﬁt most
THECOSTOFNON-EUROPE
25from market integration. Hence, limiting market integration to regions with similar
renewables production patterns potentially means missing out on substantial
tradingbeneﬁts.
• Fourth, we note that there are important redistributive eﬀects when power-plant
ﬂeets are jointly optimised. Electricity prices decline much more strongly than
systemcostswhenmarketsbecomeintegrated,indicatingashiftfromproducerto
consumer surplus in the two cases we analysed. Obviously, joint optimisation
impliesthatatleastsomeconsumersinonecountryoccasionallyhavetorelyon
production in the other country. Also, power-plant ﬂeet re-optimisation does not
onlyimplyareductionintotalcapacity,butalsoashiftintechnologiesandlocation
of the plants, which in the real world are likely to belong to diﬀerent owners. We
demonstratethattheseeﬀectsarecomplex,depending,forexample,onthelevel
ofintegrationofthediﬀerenttechnologieschosen.
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Figure8:Energysupplyforthetwocountries,withoptimisationandvaryinglevels
oftrade
Source:Bruegel.
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In this section, we evaluate empirically the beneﬁts of a truly European electricity
market.Theelectricitysector’sannualturnoverof€420billionrepresentsmorethan
3percentofEuropeanGDP20.Correspondingly,smalleﬃciencygainsintheelectricity
sectorrepresentsigniﬁcantabsoluteeﬃciencies.
Extrapolating the eﬃciencies identiﬁed in the literature survey to the EU27 market
wouldcorrespondto€11billionofpayrollcostsavings21andto€289millionperyear
of balancing cost savings (corresponding to a 10 percent total interconnection
capacity)22.Inaddition,theliteratureonfullmarketintegrationshowsthatpromising
resultscanbesecuredwhenmovingfromanationaltowardsafull-integrationscenario;
simple extrapolation of these results to the EU27 level gives a reduction in the total
systemcostof€6billion23.Deregulatingandconsolidatingelectricitymarketsinthe
USledtoanincreaseinnuclearoperatingeﬃciency;thecorrespondingvalueforthe
EUwouldbe€2.35billionannually24.Marketreformsintheelectricitysectorhavebeen
shown to be successful in reducing minute reserve power prices and leading to
substantialcostsavingsforthetransmissionsystemoperators(TSOs);theestimated
eﬀect on Europe amounts to €4.7 billion annual cost savings in the MRP markets25.
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20. Theturnoveriscalculatedbasedon3086TWhnetelectricitygenerationtimesanaverageﬁnalsalespriceof€0.136
/kWhdividedbyEUGDPof€12,900billion(alldatafromEurostatfor2012).
21. Eurostatreportsdataonaveragepersonnelcostonly.Personnelcostsarethetotalremunerationpayablebyan
employertoanemployeeforworkcarriedout.Thisisdividedbythenumberofemployees(paidworkers),which
includespart-timeworkers,seasonalworkers,etc,butexcludespersonsonlong-termleave.Asweareinterested
intotalpayrollcosts,wemultiplied€43,000(averagepersonnelcost)timesthe800,000employeesinthesector
(sourceEurelectric)andobtain€34billion(payrollcostinelectricitygenerationintheEUin2012);32percent–
theeﬃciencygainidentiﬁedbyShanefelter(2008)–ofthisis€11billion.
22. Abbasy et al (2009) estimate €80 million balancing cost savings per year (corresponding to a 10 percent total
interconnection capacity) for the Netherlands, Nordic Region and Germany. As these countries jointly represent
27.7 percent of total EU gross electricity generation, the corresponding eﬀect on EU27 would be €289 million
balancingcostsavings.
23. Gerbauleta(2012)estimateatotalsystemcostreductionof€10millionpermonth,andare-dispatchcostdecrease
of€0.2million/month.ThestudyfocusesontheregionincludingGermany,AustriaandSwitzerland,whichjointly
represent20.6percentoftotalgrosselectricitygeneration;thecorrespondingeﬀectontheEU27wouldtherefore
amountrespectivelyto€48millionand€0.97millionintotalandre-dispatchcostsavings.
24. DavisandWofram(2012)estimatethevalueofthisincreasedeﬃciencyatapproximately$2.5billionannuallyin
theUSnuclearpowermarket(in2012,€1.95billion).ThemostrecentdataonnuclearpowerplantsinEuropeand
theUSreportaninstalledelectricnetcapacityof122GWeand101GWerespectively(http://www.euronuclear.org/
info/encyclopedia/n/nuclear-power-plant-world-wide.htm and http://www.euronuclear.org/info/encyclopedia/n/
nuclear-power-plant-europe.htm).ThereforetheeﬀectscaleduptoEUlevelwouldbe€2.35billion.
25. Haucap et al (2012) estimate €1950 million and €1400 million cost savings respectively for incremental and
decremental MRP in Germany’s market for 46 months. As Germany represents 18.6 percent of the total gross
electricitygeneration,thecorrespondingeﬀectontheEU27wouldbe€4.7billioncostsavingsperyear.Evidence suggests that adopting an organised market design in the US produced
eﬃciencygains–eﬃciencyimprovementsinEuropeonasimilarscalewouldamount
toabout€700millionannually26.
AllreportedvaluesforextrapolationstotheEUlevelarepurelyindicative,becausethe
conditionsareentirelydiﬀerentfortheindividualempiricalcasesandfortheEUasa
whole. Furthermore, some of the beneﬁts might overlap and other potential beneﬁts
are not considered. Consequently we refrain from providing an estimated total for
potentialeﬃciencies.
Anotherwaytoapproachthebeneﬁtsofintegrationistoanalysemarketparticipants’
willingness to pay for cross-border lines. Suppose there are two geographical areas,
and each generates electricity up to a certain quantity. With a perfect connection
betweenthetwoareas,marketforceswoulddrivethepricetothesamelevel.Instead,
ifthereislimitedinterconnectioncapacity,thepricesinthetwoareaswillingeneral
bediﬀerent.Thus,TSOscanextractarentbyexploitingthepricediﬀerencebetween
twoareas,sellinginterconnectioncapacitythroughauctions.
Europeischaracterisedbyamultiplicityofelectricitypriceareasandbyanimperfect
interconnectionbetweenthem.ItisthereforepossibleforTSOstocollectcongestion
rents. More than €1.6 billion in congestion rents was obtained by TSOs in Europe in
theperiod2006-2009(Supponen,2012).
CASC(CapacityAllocatingServiceCompany,www.casc.eu)isthecentralauctionoﬃce
forcross-bordertransmissioncapacity,andrunsyearly,monthlyanddailyauctions,
coordinatingTSOsin10Europeancountries.
Figures9and10reportthevaluesofthetransactions(allocatedcapacityxprice)of
theyearlyandmonthly27auctions28.Comparedto2012,2013sawanoverallincrease
in the value of the transactions. While in 2012 the value of transactions in CASC
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26. Mansur and White (2012) show that an organised market design resulted in increased eﬃciency gains of $163
billioninaneasternUSregionthatswitchedfromabilateraltoanauctionmarketdesign.Theelectricitymarketin
question, PJM Interconnection, as of summer 2009, had installed generating capacity of 167,326 megawatts,
whichamountsto19.7percentoftheEU27totalelectricityinstalledcapacity.Therefore,scalingtotheEuropean
case,theeﬃciencygainsfromtradewouldamountto€690million.
27. CompletedataformonthlyauctionsspanstheperiodApril2011toApril2013,sincesomecountriesjoinedCASC
in2011.
28. Itshouldbenotedthatthedataanalysedhereonlyincludesyearlyandmonthlyauctions.Dailyauctionsarenot
included.countries was about €750 million, the ﬁrst four months of 2013 indicate an annual
valueofmorethan€900million.
Most of this stems from the auction of annual transmission capacity usage rights.
Tradersvaluedtherighttousetheinterconnectorsin2013bymorethan10percent
morethanin2012,withanincreaseinthecorrespondingauctionrevenuefrom€400
millionto€450million.
Countriesinnorthern-centralEuropeledthisgrowth29:thevalueofthetransactions,in
fact,almostdoubledforthem.Thisincreaseinvaluewaslargelyduetoanincreasein
prices; the auctioned interconnection capacity only grew by about 2.5 percent. This
increased willingness to pay for interconnection indicates an increasing demand for
transmissionlines.
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Figure9:Resultsofannualinterconnectorauctionsin€thousands
Source:CASC.
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29. Countriesincentral-northEuropeshowanincreaseinthetransactedvaluestartingfromtheﬁnalquarterof2012.
There is some degree of seasonality in the monthly transacted value, especially for the Belgium-to-Netherlands
connection,whichismoreactiveduringthesummermonths,andtheGermany-to-Switzerlandconnection,more
activeduringwinter.Thisseasonalityofthetransactedvalueisprobablybecauseofseasonalvariationsinprices
inthetwopriceareas.In southern European countries, meanwhile, the picture is more stable: the value of
thetransactionsfellby4percentin2013comparedto2012,andtheinterconnection
capacity sold was essentially the same (+0.6 percent) – reﬂecting a recession-
inducedreductioninelectricityconsumption.
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Figure10:Resultsofmonthlyinterconnectorauctionsin€thousands
Source:CASC.Note:‘North’referstointerconnectorauctionsbetweenGermanyandSwitzerland,theNetherlands,
FranceandDenmark;andbetweenBelgium,FranceandtheNetherlands;‘south’,referstointerconnectorauctions
betweenAustria,SwizerlandandItaly;andbetweenItaly,France,GreeceandSlovenia.
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Value, south Volume, southThe total value of interconnector usage could also serve as an upper bound for the
economicvalueofdoublingtheinterconnectorcapacity.Ata10percentinterestrate,
merchant investors would be unwilling to spend more than €9 billion (10 x €900
million,ietheestimatedvalueoftransactionsinCASCcountriesin2013)ondoubling
thecapacityofthecross-borderlinesunderconsideration30.
THECOSTOFNON-EUROPE
31
30. Typically, investors would be willing to spend much less as the price diﬀerentials between countries – and
consequentlythearbitragevalueofthelines–decreaseswithincreasinginterconnectorcapacity.
31. ThisboxdrawstoagreatextentonZachmann(2012).
BOX1:DOESINTEGRATIONREDUCEPRICES?31
Market coupling is one of the key policies for achieving the EU single electricity
market.TheEuropeanCommissionInternalMarketCommunicationpraisestheprice-
reducing eﬀects of market integration: “Market opening, increased cross-border
tradeandmarketintegration,andstrongercompetition…arekeepingenergyprices
incheck”(EuropeanCommission,2012,p4).
Commonsensewouldindeedsuggestthatincompetitivemarketstheaverageprice
oftwomarketzoneswillbeequalorlowerwhentheyarecoupledthanwhentheyare
separate.Infact,couplingshouldleadtoloweraveragepricesfortypicalelectricity
markets(increasingmarginalcostonthesupplysideandprice-inelasticdemand).
TheintuitivereasonisthatthemostexpensiveMWhintheexpensivecountrymight
be replaced by switching on one additional MWh in the cheaper country. As the
marginal cost increases, the switched-oﬀ MWh will be disproportionally more
expensivethantheswitchedonMWh.Inourexample(Figure11),intheﬁrstmarket
10 MWh with a marginal cost of €158-€176 is switched on while 10 MWh with a
marginalcostof€176-€239isswitchedoﬀ.Thusaveragepricesdecreasefrom€185
to€176perMWh.
Whenthereareonlyfewcompanieswithmarketpower,thiseﬀectisampliﬁedbythe
increaseinthenumberofplayersinthejointmarket.Theincreasedcompetitionin
thejointsettingwilldrivedownpricescomparedtotheseparatemarketsetting.In
our example (Figure 12) coupling two monopolistic markets (with similar cost
curves)tooneduopolisticmarketdrivesdowntheaveragepriceby7percent.Market1: Market2:
MarginalCost=Volume(1.1) MarginalCost=Volume(1.4)
Demand=100 Demand=50
Source:Bruegel.
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Figure11:Marketcouplingwithwell-behavingcostfunctionsunderperfect
competition
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Figure12:Marketcouplingwithwell-behavingcostfunctionsunderimperfect
competition
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Averageprice in separatemarkets=179
Averageprice injointmarkets=167Butwhycanmarketcoupling–counterintuitively–increaseprices?Oneexplanation
is that the price might converge to a higher price when a low-price zone is forced to
accept higher prices as a consequence of coupling (Figure 14). If, for example, the
electricity price in Germany is set by coal-ﬁred power plants (€50) and by nuclear
plants in France (€0), coupling both markets might increase the price above the
average of €25. This would, for example, happen if there was no additional nuclear
plantinFranceavailabletomeethighdemand.InthissituationallFrenchandGerman
nuclear and renewables capacity would run, but to meet the joint Franco-German
demand some German coal plants would need to run as well, and these expensive
unitswouldsetthejointprice.
However, this ideal result does not hold in all real-world situations. In 2012, market
couplingincentral-westernEuropecausedaveragepricestorise.Higherpricesand
lower total generation costs increased producer surplus by €428 million, while the
consumer surplus decreased by €67 million. After subtracting the reduction in
congestionrentof€263million,thenetwelfareeﬀectwas€98millionin2012–still
signiﬁcantlypositive(Figure13).
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Figure13:Producerandconsumersurplusandcongestionrent
Source:http://www.epexspot.com/de/Marktkopplung/dokumentation_cwe
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Figure14:Marketcouplingwithnon-linearcostfunctionsunderperfect
competition
Source:Bruegel.:
0 50 100 150
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
Demand=100
Price=100
Volume
P
r
i
c
e
0 50 100 150
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
Demand=50
Price=200
Volume
P
r
i
c
e
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
Demand=150
Price=200
Volume
P
r
i
c
e
Averagepriceinseparatemarkets=133
Averagepriceinjointmarkets=2003 Whydoesthesinglemarket
notself-organise?
Therearefourmainreasonswhypublicinterventionisnecessarytodesignaneﬃcient
Europeanenergymarket:
First,thegasandelectricitysectorisconfrontedwiththefactthatonepartofthevalue
chain is a natural monopoly that requires public intervention to produce socially
desirable results. Because the diﬀerent parts of the energy value chain are ﬁrmly
interlinked, network regulation strongly aﬀects the generation, storage and con-
sumptionsegments.
Second, the electricity sector is a very complex construct. The actions of individual
market participants have signiﬁcant externalities that aﬀect all other participants.
Becausethoseexternalitiescannotbedealtwith(internalised)byverticalintegration,
publicinterventionisnecessarytoachievesociallydesirablesectorstructures.
Third, in the EU member states, very diﬀerent market arrangements have emerged.
Thosearrangementsareapriorilargelyincompatibleacrossbordersandtradingthus
requires interfaces. The complexity of interfaces designed to make diﬀerent energy
products seamlessly tradable between more than 30 incompatible markets is huge.
The solution to this – harmonising rules – however, entails signiﬁcant redistributive
eﬀects between market participants. Thus public intervention is required to strike
stablearrangements.
Andfourth,energyisastronglypoliticisedproductinallcountries.Consequently,self-
organisationofcross-bordermarketsispoliticallyconstrained.
Thefollowingsub-sectionsdiscusstheseissuesinmoredetail.
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3. 1T henetworkisanatur almonopoly
Energynetworksarenaturalmonopolies.Thatis,buildingasecondnetworktocompete
with an existing one would neither be beneﬁcial from a company nor a societal
perspective. Consequently, in all EU countries, electricity networks are regional
monopolies.Sothatthismarketpowerisnotabused,TSOsarenotfreetosetnetwork
tariﬀs. In most EU countries, regulators try to ensure that the income of TSOs only
slightlyexceedstheoperationalandcapitalexpenditure.
Thistariﬀ-settingpowerofregulatorsisalsousedtoindirectlyincentivisethenatural
monopoly to invest in innovation, quality improvements, cost reductions and line
extensions. To deal with this complex question, very heterogeneous national
regulatory arrangements have emerged. To isolate the natural monopoly from the
competitivepartofthesector,Europeanlegislationlimitsjointcontrolovergeneration
andtransmissionassets(‘unbundling’)32.
3.2Systemnatureoftheenergysector
Electricity systems are made up of a great variety of interlinked generation,
transmissionandstorageassets.Theassetsarepartlycomplementary(powerplants
need to be connected to transmission lines), and partly substitutes (a power plant
supplyinglocaldemandmightbereplacedbyatransmissionlinethatbringselectricity
fromelsewhere).Individualdecisionshaveanimpactonallotherparticipantsinthe
system (the ‘system nature’ of the electricity sector). The physical features of
electricityrequireahighdegreeofinteractionbetweenallpartsoftheelectricity-sector
value chain. Changing one part of the system has immediate consequences for the
entiresystem.Addingonetransmissionlinemightresultintheoverloadingofanother,
andanewpowerplantmightrequirenetworkextensionshundredsofkilometresaway.
Networks cannot be evaluated in isolation: many beneﬁts of network extension can
beequallywellorbettersecuredbychangesatotherlevelsofthevaluechain.Better
coordination,demandresponse,energyeﬃciencyandgenerationmanagementcan
relievecongestion,increasereliabilityandmitigatemarketpower.
The fact that electricity networks have to be seen as a part of a system implies a
chicken-and-eggproblemforgeneration,storage,transmissionandloadinvestments.
A generation investment might only make sense if it is properly integrated into the
32. Threeadmissible’unbundling’regimesaredeﬁnedinDirective2009/72/EC.transmission grid. However, as long as there is no generation, there is no need for
investmentintransmission.
Because of the European ‘unbundling’ requirements, the externalities we have
described cannot be dealt with (internalised) by vertical integration. Thus, further
publicinterventionisnecessarytodeﬁnetheresponsibilitiesofthediﬀerentparties.
3.3Incompatiblesectorarrangementsandlocked-innationalinterests
Investmentintransmissionwouldbealoteasierifallmajorstakeholdershadthesame
preferences. However, investor interests diverge and partly conﬂict. Electricity
generatorsinzoneswithlowpriceswouldliketobeconnectedtohigher-pricezones
inordertoexport.Suchconnectionswouldalsobeappreciatedbytheconsumersin
thezoneswithhighprices.Meanwhile,generatorsinhigh-pricezoneswouldpreferto
preventcheapimports,andconsumersinlow-pricezonesdonotwanttocompetewith
othercustomersforlow-priceelectricity.Thepictureisevenmorecomplicatedinzones
with diﬀerent seasonal price patterns. For example, storage operators prefer
connectionstozoneswithhighpricevolatilitybecausethisallowsthemtobuyatlow
pricesandsellhigh.Consumersresidingclosetothestoragecapacity,however,arenot
fond of ‘importing’ higher volatility through a new line connecting to a zone with
extremepricevolatility.
TSOs–theownersandoperatorsofnationaltransmissioninfrastructure33–alsohave
complexpreferences.Theylivefromtheregulatedtariﬀstheychargetotheusersof
theirinfrastructure.Ifregulatorsgrantthemtherighttorecoverhighratesofreturnon
their transmission investments, they would prefer to overbuild the network (‘gold
plating’). Overbuilding the network means abundant capacity and peace of mind in
termsofnetworkoperation.However,lowregulatedratesofreturnandthepossibility
to be reimbursed for costs resulting from managing an insuﬃcient network might
incentivise a TSO to delay investment. Additionally, TSOs might ﬁnd that placing
restrictionsoncross-borderﬂowsisacheapwaytoensurenationalsystemsecurity.
Furthermore, if the TSO is still partly integrated with a generation company, the
incentives for the generation side of the business (eg enabling exports, preventing
imports)mightspill-overtothepreferencesoftheTSO(Supponen,2011).
National energy regulators are typically biased towards short-term tariﬀ reductions
33. SomeTSOsoperateinmultiplecountries(egtheDutchTSOTenneTownsacentralGermanTSO),othersonlyinpart
ofacountry(egtheGermanTSOAmprionoperatesonlyinthewesternpartofGermany).
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(Meeus et al, 2006). Hence, they often prefer tariﬀ reductions over investment in
transmission.Theirtaskistomaximisethewelfareofnationalnetworkusers,and,as
such,theyhavenoincentivetoconsiderthepositivecross-borderspilloversoftheir
decisions. Regulators risk being captured by interest groups (eg generators in
importingzones).
Anothergroupofstakeholders34islocalresidents,whooftendislikenewtransmission
lines in their backyards. A study commissioned by the European Commission has
identiﬁed local opposition as one of the main obstacles to transmission system
investment35.
Divergingstakeholderinterestsareampliﬁedbythediﬀeringavailabilityofinformation
todiﬀerentparties.TheTSOhasthebestinformationonthecostofoperatingexisting
transmissionlinesandconstructingnewones,whilethegenerators/storageoperators
possess the best information on their own costs and extension plans. Consumers36
have the best view of their future consumption. Stakeholders cannot rely on the
informationprovidedbyotherstakeholdersbecauseitmightbedistortedforstrategic
reasons. For example, a TSO might indicate that it will construct an additional cross-
border line in order to discourage an investment in additional power plants in the
high-pricecountry.HencethepricediﬀerentialpersistsandtheTSOcanmaintainits
congestionrent(theincomefromauctioningtransmissioncapacity).
Marketarrangementsindiﬀerentcountriesarelargelydeterminedbythepre-existing
energy system. Because sector rules are typically designed to favour incumbents,
reforms often reinforce the specialisation pattern of the physical electricity system
Forexample,acountrythatfeaturesadominantnucleargeneratorislikelytodevelop
rules that favours sources that are complementary to nuclear (hydro-storage) and
discouragesourcesthatcompetewithit(lignite,variablerenewables).
Consequently, EU member states have developed market designs that implicitly
support their local producers, consumers and transmission companies. Because of
thediﬀerentstartingpointsthesesystemshavebecomelargelyincompatiblebetween
countries.Makingevenindividualsegmentscompatibleisdiﬃcultbecausechanging
34. Theinterestsofotherstakeholdergroupssuchastradersandpowerexchangesarenotdiscussedhere,although
theirbusinessmodels(providinganationaltradingplatform,arbitragingprice-diﬀerential)arenotalwayshelped
bymoretransmissioninvestment.
35. RolandBerger(2011b,p9):“Projectdevelopersidentifypublicoppositionasakeyproblem”.
36. Thisincludeslargeindustrialconsumersaswellaselectricitysuppliersthattypicallymonitorthedemandpatterns
oftheirﬁnalcustomers.evenseeminglyminoraspectsofthemarketdesignproduceslosers.Oneexampleis
movingthegateclosure–iethetimebywhichtradersmustnotifythemarketoperator
of their supply and demand curves – forward to harmonise two systems and allow
more information on renewables to be taken into account in the scheduling of
conventionalplants.Thiswouldleavelesstimefortransmissionsystemoperatorsto
optimisethedispatchandmightreducetheneedforbalancing,andtypicalproviders
ofbalancingpower(gasturbines)andtransmissionsystemoperatorsmightloseout.
3. 4N ationalener gypolicies
Conﬂictinginterestsarenotrestrictedtoindividualstakeholders.Countriesalsohave
diﬀerent preferences. Low-cost producers such as Norway might, for industrial and
socialpolicypurposes,wanttorestrainenergyexportsinordertorestrictprices,while
othercountriesstrivetoincreasetheirexports.Transitcountriesknowthatiftheybuild
toomanytransmissionlines,thepricediﬀerentialbetweenthecountryitimportsfrom
and the country to which it exports will decrease such that the total arbitrage rent
(volume times buy price minus sell price) decreases. Thus, transit countries might
want just enough international interconnection to maximise their rents. Due to the
highly volatile national demand and supply position, the optimal transmission level
for a country is diﬃcult to establish analytically. Hence, national preferences with
respect to individual projects are strongly driven by the advocating power of
stakeholdergroups.
On a political level, countries prefer to keep control of energy policy and are thus
sceptical about increasing the levels of coordination and harmonisation. Therefore,
they retain the operation and extension of the transmission system as an issue at
nationallevel.Asaconsequence,therulesforincentivisingtransmissioninvestments
arediﬀerentinthediﬀerentEUmemberstates.Nationalnetworkextensionplansare
not regularly exchanged, and developments in the power plant ﬂeet are not com-
municatedtoneighbouringTSOs.Asaconsequence,nationalenergystrategiesmight
beinconsistent–forexampleallNordiccountriesplantoincreasetheirenergyexports
–andinternalnetworkinvestmentsareill-coordinatedacrossborders.
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4 Quantiﬁcationofthe
infrastructureinvestment
need
There are diverse motives for extending and reinforcing the transmission network.
Additionalpowerlinesmighthelptheintegrationofrenewablesandproduceimplicit
environmental beneﬁts by, for example, allowing well-connected wind-turbines to
replace generation from polluting conventional power plants. Other reinforcements
increase the reliability and operational ﬂexibility of the transmission system or
reducecongestion,dispatchcostsandlosses.Furthermore,networkinvestmentthat
allowsmoreelectricitytobetransmittedtocertainareascansubstituteinvestment
in generation or storage in import-constrained areas (‘load pockets’). Finally, a
substantial beneﬁt of transmission reinforcement is its mitigating eﬀect on local
market power, exercised by generators in load pockets (Awad et al, 2006). The
diversityofthemotivationsmakesitdiﬃculttoestablishthetotalinvestmentneeded
for the most cost-eﬀective network development. Thus, determining the optimal
infrastructureneedisachallengingexercisethatcruciallydependsonanumberof
assumptions.
(1) The most important issue is to identify what should be optimised by the
infrastructureinvestment.Possibleobjectivesareminimisingtheshort-termsystem
cost,minimisingcongestion,minimisingsystemlosses,minimisingelectricityprices,
maximising expected welfare in each member state individually, or maximising
expected European welfare. Each objective would imply diﬀerent ‘optimal’ network
layouts, investment volumes and distribution of beneﬁts between the aﬀected
stakeholders.Forexample,minimisingthenationalsystemoperationcostmightlead
to the overbuilding of domestic lines and a reduction in cross-border capacity. In a
high-cost country this might beneﬁt producers (which would have less competition
from imports) to the detriment of consumers. By contrast, a strategy to maximise
Europeanwelfaremightstrengthencross-borderlinksbutmightnotentailconnectingcertain remote uneconomic renewable sources. Choices about the objectives of
networkinvestmentarethushighlypolitical.
(2)Thesecondimportantdeterminantofanoptimalinfrastructureisthedevelopment
ofenergydemandinthecomingdecades,thoughitisdiﬃculttomakeassumptions
aboutthis.Thedeﬁnitionofthe‘optimalnetwork’mightchangesigniﬁcantlydepending
ontheexpecteddemandatacertainnetworkpoint.Ifforexamplealargealuminium
smelter (1000 MW) is established in the south of Germany instead of the north, an
extensionofelectricitylinesbetweentheCzechRepublicandsouthernGermanymight
becomebeneﬁcialtoaccommodatetheincreasedloop-ﬂows.
(3) A third important decision is which technical approaches to consider when
optimising the network investments. Excluding some options might lead to
signiﬁcantly higher deployment of higher-cost options. To give one example, if one
does not allow for demand side management in network planning, the optimal
transmissionnetworkwillneedtobesigniﬁcantlystronger.Consequently,optimising
thesystembyonlyplanninghigh-voltagecablesislikelytobeexcessivelyexpensive.
(4)Arelatedelementisthecostassumptionsmadeaboutthediﬀerentoptions.If,for
example, only the cost of the physical hardware of high-voltage lines is taken into
account,theywillalwaysappearthecheapestsolution.However,ifthecostsofgetting
approval,buyingrightsofway,compensatingresidentsandsoonarealsotakeninto
account, the cost of a new transmission line might exceed the cost of strengthening
existing corridors (eg through high temperature cables) or making changes to other
partsofthevaluechain(egcurtailingexceptionalwindpeaks).
(5) A ﬁfth determinant of which network investments are ‘optimal’ is the assumed
marketdesign.Researchhasshownthatmovingfromthecurrentsub-optimalmarket
coupling of large national zones, to centrally optimising dispatch via nodal pricing
(diﬀerentpricesateachnodeofthenetworkdependingonthephysicalnetwork)can
increase transmission capacity by up to 30 percent37. Hence, the optimal network
extensionunderanadvancedmarketdesignmightdiﬀergreatlyfromthenetworkthat
would be optimal if dispatch continues to be based on overlapping national and
Europeanrulesandmarkets.
Anumberofstudieshavetriedtoestimatetheneedintermsofrequiredﬁnanceand
physicalinfrastructureneed.Theassumptionsdiﬀermarkedlyandsodotheresults.
37. SeeNeuhoﬀ(2011).
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Roland Berger’s report (2011a) analyses the EU’s 2010-20 energy transmission
investmentneeds.Theirﬁguresshowthatdistributionandtransmissiontogetherwill
requirearound€600billionduring2010-20,ofwhichapproximately€200billionwill
be devoted to improving transmission infrastructure. Most of this investment will
involveelectricitytransmission(65percent),whiletheremaining35percentwillgoto
natural gas transmission. According to the European Commission, approximately 50
percentofthe€200billionofplannedtransmissioninvestmentisatriskofnotbeing
realisedbecauseofdelaysinpermittingproceduresandgeneraldiﬃcultiesinaccess
to ﬁnance and lack of adequate risk-mitigation mechanisms. The same report also
compares past and future planned TSO investments; the average annual TSO
investmentforelectricityprojectsduring2005-09wasaround€5.8billion,whilethe
forecastannualamountfor2010-20is€9.8billion,anincreaseofnearly70percent.
Europe’selectricityTSOshavepursuedverydiﬀerentinvestmentstrategiesinthepast.
During 2005-09, investment in energy transmission infrastructure was focused on
western Europe (Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands and the UK), where the average annual investment amounted to €3.2
billion. This region also expects to see the largest relative increase during 2010-20
(+94percentcomparedtothe2005-09averageannualinvestmentamount).
TheEuropeanEnergyInfrastructurePrioritiesreport(EuropeanCommission,2010a)
arguesthat,sincetheelectricitysectorisexpectedtofaceincreasingdemandinthe
futureandsincetheelectricitygenerationmixischanging,withlessgenerationfrom
fossil fuels and more electricity from renewable and variable energy sources, large-
scaleinvestmentsareneededatalevelnotseeninpastdecades.Thestudyquantiﬁes
theinfrastructureinvestmentneedsforelectricityfrom2011-20asfollows:€70billion
for transmission infrastructure, €32 billion for oﬀshore grid infrastructure and €40
billionforsmartgridinfrastructure.Asaresult,thetotalinvestmentneedis€142billion
forelectricity(whilethetotalsystemcostsareestimatedtobeabout€1000billion).
A 2013 OECD working paper (Benatia et al, 2013) compares two diﬀerent grid
development scenarios and shows that, in a grid expansion scenario, that is
characterisedbya20percentincreaseintransmissioncapacity,thecostofmeeting
renewablesobjectiveswouldbealmost$68billionlowerthanunderthegridshortage
scenario (Figure 15). In addition, if domestic grids are well-reinforced, the average
Eﬀective Capacity Factor in the EU might strongly increase compared to both the
baselineandthegridshortagescenario.THEINFRASTRUCTUREINVESTMENTNEED
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Figure15:AdditionalinvestmentinwindturbinesrequiredtoreachtheEU2020
target
Source:Benatiaetal(2013).
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Grid shortage scenario
TheEuropeanCommission’sEnergyRoadmap2050(EuropeanCommission,2011a)
also refers to several policy scenarios. The reference scenario yields the lowest
investment requirements, while the traditional-technology scenarios converge to a
slightlyhigherinvestmentlevelbothby2030and2050.Aclear-cutresultisprovided
by the renewable scenario (with a 75 percent share of RES in ﬁnal energy
consumption), especially during the 2031-50 period. Indeed, infrastructure
requirementsreach€1323billion(Figure16).The‘HighRES’scenariogivesatotalgrid
investmentcostfor2011-50ofapproximately€2195billion,whichimpliesanincrease
ininfrastructurerequirementsofabout73percentcomparedtothereferencescenario.THEINFRASTRUCTUREINVESTMENTNEED
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Figure16:TheEU’sgridinvestmentneeds
Source:EuropeanCommission(2011b).
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Referencescenario
High RESscenario
TheENTSO-ETenYearNetworkDevelopmentPlan2012(TYNDP,ENTSO-E,2012)gives
anoverviewofallgriddevelopmentactivitiesintheENTSO-Eregion.Theexpectedgrid
investmentforallprojectsofpan-Europeansigniﬁcanceinthenexttenyearsvariesby
country,withGermanyspendingthemostat€30.1billion,accordingtotheTYNDP.The
total investment cost within the whole ENTSO-E perimeter is estimated to be around
€104billion(€23-28billionduringtheperiod2010-14,accordingtoENTSO-ETYNDP,
2010). Presently, the European transmission network consists of approximately
305,000kmofroutes.Completingtheprojectsofpan-Europeansigniﬁcancewilllead
to refurbishment of about 9,000 km of existing assets and building of 43,200 km of
newassetsinthelong-term,increasingthetotallengthofthenetworkby17percent
over the next ten years (of which 76 percent will be overhead, and 24 percent
underground or subsea). It is estimated that moving from the currently limited Net
TransferCapacities(NTCs)togreaterNTCsonceprojectsofpan-Europeansigniﬁcance
are implemented will alleviate total annual generation operational costs by about 5
percent.Forthehighergenerationcoststhatcanbeexpectedby2020,thisrepresents
about€5billion.
The European Climate Foundation’s (ECF) study (2011) shows that the share of
transmission expansion investment in the overall energy system cost will be
comparativelylowduringthenextdecade,ie€46billionoutof€2273billionin2020,
and€68billionoutof€3277billionin2030(Figure17).Theinvestmentrequiredfor
both generation and transmission are substantially reduced if there is cross-bordercoordination, higher demand response and greater energy eﬃciency. Transmission
costsreducebyupto56percent,from€68to€30billion,withahighlevelofenergy
eﬃciency.
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Figure17:Transmissioncostsunderdifferentscenarios
Source:ECF(2011).
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Reboursetal(2010)arguethatanincreaseincross-bordercapacitybetweenFrance
and its neighbours by 7 GW would have an annual cost of about €380 million and a
beneﬁtof€980million–anetbeneﬁtofabout€600million.Accordingtotheauthors,
thiscorrespondstotheoptimalreinforcement,becauseonlyincreasingthecapacity
by5GWwouldleadtobeneﬁtsworth€200millionless,whileincreasingthecapacity
by10GWleadstocoststhataremorethan€200millionhigher.
VonHirschhausen(2012)discussesvariousestimatesoftheinvestmentneed,ﬁnding
bothahighvarianceamongestimates,andthattheﬁnancingofgenerationinvestment
is the real challenge. Von Hirschhausen (2012) argues that the issue is not over- or
underinvestment in the European electricity sector as such, but that diﬀerent
development paths have diﬀerent implications for generation and transmission
infrastructure,andconsequentlyforﬁnancing.Inthatcontext,apositive,diﬀerentiated
analysisseemsmoreappropriatethananormativerequestformoreinvestment.Last
butnotleast,theinvestmentneedsmustbeassessedinthelightofthepoliticaland
institutionalscenariothatisexpectedtooccur.Ina‘Europecentralised’scenario,there
isampleroomforpan-Europeanelectricitynetworks,whichbecomelessrelevantinaTHEINFRASTRUCTUREINVESTMENTNEED
47
‘national approaches’ scenario. Furthermore, he argues that more complete con-
siderationof‘transactioncost’wouldleadtosigniﬁcantlyhighercostassumptionsfor
networks.
Tosumup,thedeﬁnitionoftheoptimalnetworkdependsstronglyontheassumptions
that are made. This is the main reason why diﬀerent studies produce signiﬁcantly
divergingresultsoninvestmentneedsandtheeconomicconsequencesofinvestment
choices.Thisimpliesthattheprocessusedtoreachacertainresultismoreimportant
thantheresultingoutcome.
The Spanish example might serve as a cautionary tale. Between 2008 and 2010,
Spanishspendingonelectricitytransmissioninfrastructureincreasedby18percent
to €865 million and even exceeded German spending in 2010. It is now becoming
obvious that Spanish consumers must pay for a network that is excessive for their
needsfortheforeseeablefuture.5 Evaluatingthecurrent
approachtotheinternal
market
Therearetwomainbuildingblocksfortheinternalmarket:themarketdesignandthe
provisioning of physical infrastructure. In this section, we describe current and
foreseen approaches to both and provide a critical evaluation with respect to the
internalmarket.
5.1Marketdesign
Current approach
Electricity is not a simple product that is produced, exchanged and consumed. A
numberoffactorsmustbetakenintoaccountintradingelectricity.Keydeterminants
ofthevalueoftheelectricityserviceare(insimpliﬁedterms):
• The volume of electricity: This is the most straightforward component,
typically measured in megawatt hours (MWh) at the wholesale level and
kilowatthours(kWh)attheretaillevel.
• The location of delivery: Like any product or service, electricity only has a
value when delivered to the customer. Consequently, electricity is more
expensive in countries in which it is more diﬃcult to produce and cannot
easilybeimported.However,foradministrativereasons,electricityhaswithin
mostEuropeancountries(theNordiccountriesandItalybeingexemptions)
thesamepriceatthewholesalelevelateachlocation.
• Speed of delivery: Electricity travels at the speed of light. But, facilities to
produce or consume it need time and sometimes fuel to ramp-up or ramp-
down.Consequently,themoreimmediatethedeliveryrequirement,themore
expensive electricity typically is. To schedule deliveries using the latest
48EVALUATINGTHECURRENTAPPROACH
49
available information on likely demand and supply (eg from renewable
sources),asequenceofmarketsisestablished:along-termforwardmarket
forannualormonthlydeliveriesthattypicallycoversthelargestvolumes;a
day-ahead market that largely determines the scheduling of power plants
withlowvariablecostsandlongrampingtimes(egnuclearandligniteplants);
anintradaymarketthatrespondstochangesinsupplyanddemand,leading
tothereschedulingofpowerplantswithshort-to-mediumrampingtimes(eg
gas turbines); and a balancing market in which very short-term deviations
fromtheinitially-plannedscheduleareexchanged.
• The ability to stabilise the system: This entails (i) maintenance of the
balance between generation and demand using turbine speed generators
(PrimaryControl),(ii)maintenanceofexchangeswithothercontrolareasat
theprogrammedlevelsandreturningthefrequencytoitssetvalueincaseof
a major frequency deviation, thus restoring primary control reserve
(Secondary Control), (iii) restoration of an adequate secondary control
reserve(TertiaryControl),(iv)startingoperatinganddeliveringpowerwithout
assistancefromtheelectricsystem(Black-startCapability)and(v)injecting
orwithdrawingreactivepowertokeepsystemvoltagewithinprescribedlevels
atspeciﬁcnodes(ReactivePower).Theseﬁveservicesaretypicallyreferred
toasancillaryservices.
• The availability to meet demand (‘ supply adequacy’): There is a value in
being sure that electricity is delivered when needed. Such insurance can
theoretically be provided by outbidding competing consumers for a given
limited supply in the long-term markets. The resulting high prices would
encourage the necessary investments and ensure supply adequacy. In
marketswithhighregulatoryriskandadministrativebarriersthismechanism
might not provide the optimal level of supply38. Consequently, other
mechanisms/marketstoremuneratemarketparticipantsfortheircontribution
to supply adequacy are being considered/implemented in the EU and
elsewhere.
• The‘technologyexternality’ofelectricity:Installingnewtechnologiesimplies
technological and organisational improvements. The initially high cost of
deployinganot-fullymaturetechnologycantranslateintovaluablelearning,
bothfortechnologyprovidersandtheentiresystemthathastoaccommodate
new technology. This is relevant, for example, for the deployment of new
renewablegenerationtechnologies,newstoragetechnologiesandsmartgrids.
38. Thereisalongstandingacademicandpoliticaldebateabouttheneedforcapacitymechanisms.Seeforexample
the public consultation on generation adequacy, capacity mechanisms and the internal market in electricity:
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/consultations/20130207_generation_adequacy_en.htm• The carbon content of electricity: The CO2 emissions linked to power
production are an externality that can be either dealt with by diﬀerently
valuing‘dirty’electricitycomparedto‘clean’electricity,orbytreatingpollution
directly(throughtaxes,pollutionpermitsorregulation).AstheEUhaschosen
to set up an emissions trading system that covers the power sector, the
‘cleanness’ofelectricityispricedoutsidetheelectricityservice.
The diﬀerent parts of the electricity value chain produce and consume diﬀerent
combinations of these determinants. For example, nuclear power plants provide at
their location capacity and reactive power and can hence either provide secondary
reserveorproduceelectricityandreactivecurrentonlongorshortnotice(dayahead,
intraday). To a limited degree, nuclear plants are also able to provide frequency and
voltagecontrolaswellasbalancingservices.Windturbinesbycontrastonlyprovide
stochastic capacity contributions. When the wind blows they will produce electricity
and,ifcorrespondinglyequipped,reactivecurrentanddownwardbalancing.
Foreachoftheseelements,diﬀerentremunerationschemescanbesetup.WithinEU
memberstates,theseschemesdiﬀersigniﬁcantly.Sofar,onlythemarketforemission
allowancesiscompletelyharmonisedintheEU.Atthewholesalelevel,thevalueofa
megawatthourofelectricityisdeterminedinnationalmarketsthatareinternationally
coupledbyaseeminglystablebutarguablyineﬃcientlyinterface–marketcoupling.
Intheintraday,reserveandbalancingsegmentsthatareessentialforremuneratingthe
speedofdelivery,somecountriesrelyonthesystemoperatorsandsomeonbilateral
trading, while others are about to introduce organised markets – but cross-border
tradingisstilllimited.Thesameholdstruefor‘ancillaryservices’.Morecomplexmarket
arrangementshaveemergedinsomecountries,butcorrespondingproductsarerarely
sourcedinneighbouringcountries.
Finally, most countries do not have markets for ‘technology externality’, ‘supply
adequacy’and‘location’,whichimpliesthatthesedeterminantsareatmostimplicitly
exchanged across borders. These determinants are provided administratively in
member states based on national preferences. For example, to remunerate the
‘technology externality’, each EU country has adopted a diﬀerent set of policies,
including green certiﬁcates, feed-in tariﬀs, obligations, direct subsidies, preferential
grid access regulations and tax breaks. The actual size of the diﬀerent support
schemes for renewables is diﬃcult to assess because they often mix ﬁscal (direct
support),para-ﬁscal(forexamplecompulsoryapportionmentscollectedbynetwork
operators) and non-ﬁscal (regulatory) instruments. The numbers that the European
Commission’s Directorate-General for Competition collects on state aid for
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environmentalprotectionhintatlargedivergencesinthestructureandsizeofsupport
providedtorenewablesbydiﬀerentEUcountries.In2009,suchstateaidamountedto
1.1percentofGDPonaverageintheEU.Butitwas2.4percentofGDPinGermanyand
only 0.12 percent of GDP in Italy. Such diﬀerences are economically ineﬃcient
becausetheyleadtodiﬀerentpricesforthesameproduct(electricityproducedfrom
renewablesources)withintheEU39.Thus,theEuropeanCommissionhasbeenpushing
for transferability of renewable energy achievements. Such transferability – for
example through an obligation for any member-state’s support scheme to accept
foreign ‘green’ electricity – should quickly lead to the harmonisation of support
schemesandpricesforrenewableenergy,andasinglemarketforelectricitygenerated
fromrenewablesources.However,theCommissionhassofarfailedtopushthrough
plans to achieve such transferability – because the fragmentation of Europe’s
renewablesmarketreﬂectsthepoliticalpreferencesofEUmemberstates.Countries
would rather reduce their dependence on imported energy and support their home-
grownrenewablesindustriesthansubsidiserenewableenergyproductioninanother
memberstate.
Between2005and2010Germanydeployedabout9gigawatts(GW)ofwindturbines
and14GWofsolarpanels,amountingtoabout18percentoftotalinstalledelectricity
generation capacity. The success of renewable energy support schemes will create
new challenges for other parts of the electricity sector. The observed wind energy
forecasterrorsforGermanyin2012,forexample,implythatsometimesupto6000MW
of additional capacities have to be switched on in the intraday market while at other
timesupto10,000MWhavetobeswitchedoﬀ(Figure18).In2012,inmorethan1000
hours, more than 2000 MW needed to be switched on, and in more than 400 hours,
more than 2000 MW needed to be switched oﬀ. This implies an increasing need for
adequately remunerating intra-day deliveries, balancing, ‘location’ and ancillary
services.
Inthelong-term,‘supplyadequacy’mightbeoneofthemostseriouselements.TheEU
isoncoursetomeetits2020renewablestargetanditisnowdiscussingrenewables
targets for 2030. By 2050, Europeans hope to get all their power from renewable or
carbon-freesources.Thistransitionwillchangethenatureofthepowersector.Unlike
39. A European market for renewables deployment could make signiﬁcantly better use of natural resources. For
example,ifthe32.3GWofsubsidisedGermansolarpowerhadbeeninstalledinGreece,thevalueoftheadditional
electricitygeneratedbecauseofthe50percenthigherlevelofsunshinewouldhavebeenaround€600millionin
2013 (Greece has an annual solar return of about 1500 kWh/kWp while Germany only has 1000 kWh/kWp and
thebaseloadelectricitypriceinGermanyiscurrentlyabout€38/MWh).fossilfuels,theinput(orvariable)costsofwindandsolarpowerarezero.Thatmeans
thatwindandsolarpowerinstallationstypicallyrunirrespectiveoftheelectricityprice.
AsthepenetrationofrenewablesinEUpowermarketsincreases,conventionalpower
plantsareoftenidle,andmedianwholesaleelectricitypricesdrop.Yetsomeconven-
tional plants are still needed when a cloudy, low-wind period coincides with high
electricitydemand.However,inthecurrentsystem,coalandgas-ﬁredplantswillclose
unlesstheycanrecovertheirﬁxedcostsbychargingveryhighpricesinthefewhours
they are needed. To date there is no consensus on whether such a system of highly
volatile prices (very low prices when renewables are suﬃcient to meet demand and
veryhighpricesiftheyarenot)ispoliticallysustainableandsuﬃcienttoincentivise
theprovisionofback-upcapacityneededtorunthesystemsecurely.Memberstates
are thus contemplating alternative mechanisms to make it worthwhile for power
companiestoprovideback-upcapacity.Discussionsatthetimeofwritingindicatethat
suchincentivesarelikelytobenon-marketbased40andwillvaryfromonecountryto
another.
40. The strategic reserve discussed in Germany, for example, foresees that a small number of plants that fulﬁl the
selectioncriteriacanbidtobecomereserveproviders(seeBDEW,2013).
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Performance
Theintegrationofwest-Europeanday-aheadelectricitywholesalemarketshasbeen
thebiggestsuccesssofarofthesingleenergymarketpolicy.Alreadythepossibility
toreservetransmissioncapacitiesthroughauctionshasallowedbettercross-border
tradeleadingtopartialpriceconvergencebetweencountries41(Zachmann,2008).The
market coupling introduced between Belgium, France and the Netherlands in 2006;
Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Germany and Luxembourg in 2010; Italy and
Slovenia in 2011; and some direct current links (Germany-Sweden, Norway-
Netherlands, Poland and Sweden) have substantially reduced price discrepancies
betweencountries.Forexample,thefrequencyofhourswithidenticalwholesaleprices
on both sides of the German-Dutch border increased from 12 percent in 2010 to 87
percentin2011,whencouplingwasintroduced42.
For other market segments, performance depends on the region-speciﬁc arrange-
ments. Cross-border balancing and intraday markets have worked quite well in the
41. 59percentofthestudiedhourlypairsofnationalwholesaleelectricitypricesin2002-06converged.
42. ACERPressRelease(ACER-PR-02-12)(CEER-PR-07-12).
Figure18:Day-aheadwindforecasterrorsinGermanyin2012inMW
Source:BruegelbasedonTenneT,Amprion,50HertzandTransnetBW
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HoursNordiccountriessince1999.Cross-borderexchangesaresigniﬁcantandthemarket
is liquid even though it only corresponds to one percent of the turnover of the day-
ahead market. The system began trading activities in Germany in 2006-07. A joint
intraday market was launched by the Dutch, Belgian and Nordic power exchange in
2012,butvolumesarestillverysmall.Inotherregions,forexamplebetweenPoland
andGermany,nostructuredcross-bordertradeispossibleintheintradaymarket.
Thevalueoflocationofelectricitydeliveriesislargelyremuneratedintheday-ahead
andtheintraday/balancingmarketintheNordiccountries.There,bringingelectricity
tosupply-constrainedpartsofthecountryisprovidinghigherrevenues.Forexample,
inApril2013,bringingelectricityfromcentralSweden(€43.91/MWh)totheconnected
NorwegianregionofTrondheim(€46.37/MWh)wasabout5percentmorebeneﬁcial
thanbringingittothelikewiseconnectedNorwegianregionofTromso(€44.48/MWh).
InthehighlymeshedcontinentalEuropeangrid,suchintra-countrydiﬀerentiationof
electricity prices is not employed. Hence, bringing additional electricity to north
Germany – where it is often excessively available due to the concentration of wind
powerinthisregion–hasthesamevalueasbringingittosouthGermany,whereitis
scarcewhenthesundoesnotshineontheBavariansolarpanels.
Finally,ancillaryservices,‘greenness’andadequacy/capacityarecurrentlynottraded
acrossborders.Table12showsthatthepartsoftheelectricitysectorthatarecurrently
becomingmoreimportantarenotinternationallyexchanged.Moreover,theeconomic
beneﬁtsofaEuropeanmarketforthesepartsofthesectorareparticularlysigniﬁcant.
Consequently,thecostof‘non-Europe’isincreasing.
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Table12:Determinantsofthevalueoftheelectricityserviceandhowits
allocationisorganised
Nationally Purely National European Expected
administered National market market changein
provision market arrangement Importance
arrangement withan
interfacefor
imports/exports
Frequencyand +
voltagecontrol
OtherAncillary
services43
Balancing Nordic+ +
Intradaydelivery Nordic+ +
ofelectricity
Day-aheadand -
termdelivery
ofelectricity
SupplyAdequacy +
Location Nordic +
‘Greenness’ Quotas +
Emissions ETS
Source:Bruegel.Note:shadedcellsindicatehowallocationoftheserviceistypicallyorganised.
Furthermore,thediﬀerentelementsoftheelectricitysupplysystemobviouslyinteract.
Forexample,(i)acountrywithamarketforsupplyadequacywilltypicallyseelower
pricesduringhourswithextremelyhighdemandthanacountrywithoutsuchamarket
– as the peak capacity in the ﬁrst case is already remunerated through the capacity
mechanism, (2) if international intraday trading is not possible because inter-
connectorscannotbenominatedwithintheday,patternsofinternationalday-ahead
tradingchange,(3)ifrenewablesaresupportedwithfeed-intariﬀsnegativewholesale
day-ahead market prices might appear and (4) if providing electricity to a speciﬁc
location where supply is constrained is not remunerated by the market, other
administrative instruments to ensure adequate supply need to be devised.
43. SuchasTransmissionMustRunService,LoadShedSchemeServiceandBlackStartService.Consequently,evenifsomepartsofthemarketdesignareharmonisedacrossborders,
onecannotspeakofafunctioningsinglemarketforthis,becauseinconsistenciesin
thetradingofotheraspectsarespilling-overtotheharmonisedsegment.
Ongoingprogress
Inconsistencies in the design of national markets have been acknowledged at the
European level. The European Commission has concluded that more top-down
guidanceintheformofa‘TargetModel’isdesirable.In2009,Europeanregulatorsand
stakeholdersﬁnalisedtheTargetModel.Thepreparationofframeworkguidelines(and
eventually ‘network codes’, that deal with technical issues such as the allocation of
cross-bordertransmissioncapacityortherequirementsforgenerators)basedonthe
Target Model started in early 2010. In simple terms, the process foresees that the
Agency for the Coordination of European Regulators will develop four framework
guidelinesoncapacityallocationandcongestionmanagement,networkconnection,
system operation and balancing. Based on these, the European Network of
TransmissionSystemOperatorswilldevelopEuropeannetworkcodes.TheseEuropean
codesshouldcoverallprovisionsthatarerelevantforcross-bordertrade.Afterthese
codes are (possibly amended and) approved by the regulator, they will become
binding. The current draft codes, at time of writing, indicate that they are in fact
guidelines with a lot of ﬂexibility on how they are transposed into the individual
member states network codes. For example, Article 24 of the draft network code on
capacity allocation and congestion management allows member states to maintain
thecurrentmodelofcapacitycalculationbasedonasimpliﬁedrepresentationofthe
network,ortomovetoamodelbasedonthetruephysicalrepresentation.
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44. ThisboxdrawstoagreatextentonZachmann(2013,p5).
45. The Netherlands and Belgium have installed phaseshifting transformers that allow the loading of individual
transmissionlinestobecontrolled.Thetransformerscanbeusedtoavoidsystem-destabilisinginﬂowsofelectricity
fromGermany(causedbyunexpectedwind-injections).Polandisalsoconsideringthis.
InadditiontothisEuropeanharmonisationofthenetworkcodes,somecountriesare
improving their cooperation on issues such as system operation or day-ahead and
intradaymarketcoupling.
Intermsofmarketcoupling,forexample,thestakeholdersincentralwesternEuropean
countries are working to introduce ‘ﬂow-based market coupling’ an algorithm that
shouldallowoptimalday-aheadandintradaytradingofelectricitybetweencountries,
giventherealphysicalconstraintsofthenetwork.Furthermore,initiativesareinplace
toextendmarketcouplingtoanincreasingnumberofcountries,egcouplingtheNordic
andthecentral-westernregion,andcouplingtheVisegrad4countries(CzechRepublic,
BOX2:NATIONALNETWORKOPERATIONINASINGLEMARKET44
Theoperationofnationalorsub-nationalelectricitynetworkshassigniﬁcantspillover
eﬀectsontoneighbouringsystems.Theseinterdependencieswerehighlightedby
the2006blackoutinGermanythatspilledoverasfarastheIberianPeninsula,and
by the 2003 blackout in Italy caused by a failure in Switzerland. The tedious
searchesforthepartiesresponsibleforthesemajorincidentsareaclearindication
ofthecomplexityoftheelectricitysystemanditsgovernance.
Diﬀerent TSOs have drawn diﬀerent conclusions from the blackouts and the
increasing injection of only partly predictable wind and solar power: (1) the Dutch
TenneTandtheBelgianELIAtriedtoimprovetheircapabilitytodealwithcross-border
eventsbymergingwithGermanTSOs,(2)severalTSOsareinstallingdevicestolimit
cross-borderﬂows,inordertoretaincontroloftheirdomesticsystems45,(3)groups
of TSOs established two regional centres for coordinating electricity system
operation.Nevertheless,allsystemsarestilloperatednationallyandcollaboration
is limited to ad-hoc initiatives. To prevent black-outs, the inadequacy of the
cooperation arrangements for managing the real-time electricity system are
currentlydealtwithbyimposinghighsecuritymarginsandbyacceptingineﬃcient
nationally-focused operational decisions. This ultimately has an impact on the
demand for transmission assets (for example, more phase-shifting transformers
andfewercross-borderlines).Hungary, Poland and Slovakia). Finally, closer cooperation on system operation is
institutionalisedinregionalcentressuchasCoresoandtheTSOSecurityCooperation46.
Shortcomings
Theenvisagedchanges,atthetimeofwriting,tothemarketframeworkareinsuﬃcient
forestablishingtheinternalenergymarket47.
First, the harmonisation of rules relevant for cross-border trade is organised as a
bottom-up agreement between system operators based on general framework
guidelines.Theseruleswillbecodiﬁedintheformoftwelvenetworkcodes.Duetothe
complexity of the electricity sector and the widely diﬀering preferences of
stakeholders, a compromise risks providing no more than fairly general direction. In
addition, the short timeframe for drafting the network codes – only 12 months were
foreseen for completion of the process in time for the 2014 deadline – could give
undue inﬂuence to the TSOs that have a signiﬁcant information advantage on to
technical issues, and which are responsible for drafting the codes. It is, for example,
conceivablethatTSOswillshiftcostlyresponsibilitiesforsystemstabilityontonetwork
users. The tight political deadline might force ACER and the European institutions
(Council, Parliament and Commission), that have to adopt the codes through
comitology, to favour speed over thoroughness. Only when the network codes are
implementedwillwelearnhowdiﬀerentlytheymightbeinterpreted48.Consequently,
thisapproachmightleadtoawiderangeofrulesintheparticipatingnationalsystems,
whichisunlikelytobringaboutworkableinterfacesatallbordersforalldimensionsof
electricitytrade.
Second,networkcongestionwithincountrieswillbedealtwithdiﬀerentlyfromnetwork
congestionbetweencountries.Thisdiscriminationisnecessarytobeabletoconsider
countries as single price zones. For example, the price of electricity in the port city
Hamburg is the same as in Freiburg in southern Germany even when the 600km
transmissionlinebetweenbothcitiesiscongestedbecauseofanabundanceofpower
fromcoastalwindturbines.Atthesametime,thepriceinFreiburgmightbediﬀerent
from the price in Colmar, 30 kilometres away in France, even when the transmission
line between Freiburg and Colmar is not congested. Such a disregard of physical
infrastructure, implied by the imposition of country-based price zones, induces an
46. Five major TSOs set up Coreso, a Regional Coordination Service Centre in 2008 in central-western Europe, and
elevenTSOssetupthe‘TSOSecurityCooperation’incentraleasternEurope.
47. ThissectiondrawstoagreatextentonZachmann(2013,p6).
48. SeethesummaryofthepublicconsultationonthenetworkcodesinEuropeanCommission(2013).
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overlyconservativecalculationofcross-bordertransmissioncapacities.Theendresult
ishigher-thannecessarypricediﬀerentialsbetweenthezones/countries.Inaddition,
plannedtechnicalimprovementstotheexistingscheme(NTC-basedmarketcoupling)
towardsamoreadvancedschemethattakesthephysicalnetworkbetterintoaccount
(ﬂow-based market coupling) as well as the extension of market coupling to other
countriesisfacingtechnicaldiﬃculties.Marketcouplingisasystemthatinprinciple
wouldensurethatpricediﬀerentialsbetweencountriesonlyarisewhennoadditional
transmission capacity can be made available. Already in 2012 the deadline for the
start of the arguably more advanced ‘ﬂow-based market coupling’ in the central-
westernregion(Austria,Benelux,France)hadtobepostponedfromSeptember2012
toNovember2013attheearliest49.Now,thecouplingoftheNordicmarketswiththe
central-western markets has also been delayed from the beginning of 2013 to
November201350.
Third,amoregeneralpoint:accordingtothetargetmodel,thesingleelectricitymarket
will only provide harmonised signals for the operation of existing assets (including
generation, transmission, storage and demand-side response). National markets/
regulationswillremainpivotalforinvestmentinnewassets.Nationallyimplemented
markets for capacity and ancillary services favour the construction of certain
technologiesincertaincountries.In2012,about70percentofnewlyinstalledpower
plantsintheEUwererenewables(EWEA,2013).Theseplantsarelargelybuiltbased
onnationalsupportschemesandarethusexemptedfromthesingleelectricitymarket.
Iftheshareofnationallyorganisedelectricitysectorsegments(renewables,capacity
mechanisms, ancillary services) continues to increase at the current pace, a ‘deep
singlemarket’thatalsodrivesoptimalinvestmentdecisionswillbeunachievable.
Consequently,thetargetmodel–eveniffullyimplemented–isunlikelytodelivera
fully-ﬂedgedsinglemarketinwhichitisirrelevantfortheremunerationofasupplier
whetheritissitedinthesameoradiﬀerentcountrytoitscustomer.
5.2Funding,ﬁnancingandplanningofinfrastructure
The establishment of suﬃcient energy infrastructure is the second part of the EU’s
visionforasingleenergymarket.TheCommissionhasestimatedthat€142billionwill
have to be spent on electricity grids up to 2020. Transmission investment in Europe
49. http://www.epexspot.com/de/presse/news-
archive/details/news/CWE_Flow_Based_Market_Coupling_Go_Live_target_date_has_been_shifted
50. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-02-18/northwest-european-power-market-coupling-delayed-to-
november.htmlneedtoincreaseforthreereasons:First,investmenthasdroppedtoahistoriclowin
the past decade, resulting in some modernisation backlog (see section 4). Second,
themassivedeploymentofrenewableswillrequireadditionalinvestmentinorderto
adaptthenetworktothechanginglocationofelectricitygeneration,andtoallowforthe
widegeographicaveragingofelectricityinjectionsfromintermittentsources.Andthird,
inordertodevelopthesinglemarket,suﬃcientelectricityﬂowsacrossbordersneed
tobeenabled.
5.2.1Currentapproach
Funding
Most energy infrastructure in Europe is provided at member state level and funded
through a ‘regulated asset base’ model. To incentivise a TSO to construct new
transmissioninfrastructure,theregulatorallowstheTSOtoincludeallnewassetsinthe
regulatedassetbaseiftheywerepartoftheinvestmentplanapprovedbytheregulator.
The regulator’s approval is based on a more-or-less sophisticated cost-beneﬁt
analysis51.Whentheapprovedprojectisﬁnalised,itscapitalcostbecomespartofthe
regulated asset base. The TSO can now pass on the higher cost to the network
customers.Inshort,anationalregulatorapproves–basedonthewelfareofnational
network users – the investment plan of a national TSO that is then allowed to claim
backthecapitalcostfromnationalnetworkusers52.
For some cross-border projects – such as the sea cables between Norway and the
Netherlands – a second funding scheme has been tested. Investors might seek the
righttouseatransmissionlineexclusivelyforsometime.Theythencanearnmoney
bysellinglinecapacitytotradersorbyusingitthemselvestotransportelectricityfrom
a low-price area to a high-price area. This is known as the merchant interconnector
approach.Thisapproachsuﬀersfromthedrawbackthattheoptimalinvestmentforan
individualcompanyislessthanthesociallyoptimalinvestment–iftheinter-connector
is too big, the price diﬀerence between the zones collapses and there is no more
money to be made through arbitrage. Hence, proﬁt-maximising merchant investors
havesystematicallyunder-builtnetworkextensions.Furthermore,suchanapproach
isnotwellsuitedforcomplexnetworks.
51. Regulators or governments need to approve all investment projects before they are allowed to be ﬁnanced via
tariﬀs.
52. In addition, single-purpose lines to connect new users are often funded by the new generation, storage or
consumptionunitthatrequiredtheconnection.
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A third approach has been to contribute public money to politically selected
transmission projects. The EU has for example allocated funds for lines with cross-
bordereﬀectsintheframeworkoftheTrans-EuropeanNetworksforEnergy(TEN-E,see
discussion under ‘Policy performance’ in section 5.2.2) and the European Energy
ProgrammeforRecovery.
Nationalplanning
Currently,networkextensioninmostEUcountriesisbasedondecentralisedplanning.
TSOs forecast future power plant ﬂeets and electricity demand in their areas. They
deducefromtheseforecaststhelikelyneedfornewlines.NationalTSOsdiﬀerinthe
degree to which they coordinate with power plant and storage facility investors,
administration,regulators,consumersandforeignTSOs.TheTSOswilltherebypropose
projectsthatarecommerciallyviableforthem.ForaTSO,alineisviablewhenitreduces
those costs that a TSO is not allowed to fully charge to the customers53.T h u s ,aT S O
mightbeinclinedtoproposeevenoverly-expensivelinesthatslightlyreducetheTSO’s
re-dispatch costs as long as the regulator accepts that the TSO can include the
investmentcostintheregulatedassetbase.Incontrast,aTSOmightnotbeinterested
inclosingaminorgapthatpreventssubstantialincreasesininternationalelectricity
tradewhenthiswouldresultinhigherre-dispatchcosts.ThusTSOsdonotnecessarily
haveanincentivetoproposethemostcost-eﬀectiveline.Nevertheless,theyarethe
only body carrying out the planning in all European countries, because no other
institution has suﬃcient technical expertise for this complex task. The regulators
largelyrelyontheinformationprovidedbytheTSOswhentheyassesstheeconomics
oftheindividualprojectstheTSOhasproposed.Furthermore,evenpolicymakersand
regional authorities typically only consider the projects proposed by the TSOs when
decidingoncorridorsorpublicco-funding.
Europeanplanning
Until 2010, transmission planning was in general an exercise conducted at the level
of member states (or transmission zones). Projects with cross-border impacts were
ofcoursediscussedandadjustedbyTSOs,butnojointplanningofthenetworkswas
carried out. Since 2010 a formal procedure has been put in place to structure these
53. ThecostaTSOisallowedtorecoverfromconsumersthroughtariﬀsdiﬀersfromcountrytocountryandisvariable
overtime.Consequently,startingwiththesamephysicalbottleneck,inonecountrythelocalTSOmighthavean
incentivetoupgradeanexistingline,inanotherthelocalTSOmightprefertocarryoutmoreredispatch,andinathird
countryitmightbemostproﬁtableforthelocalTSOtoinvestinsmartgridsolutions.Foradiscussiononnetwork
investmentincentivesinEuropeseevonHirschhausenetal(2012).interactions. TSOs now have to share some of this information with the European
NetworkofTransmissionSystemOperatorsforElectricity(ENTSO-E)whichusesthese
inputstobuilda10-YearNetworkDevelopmentPlan.ThisEuropeanplanwastheﬁrst
commonEuropeannetworkmodellingexercisebasedonmassivedatagatheringand
astructuredconsultationprocess.Henceitisabigsteptowardsmoretransparentand
morecommonnetworkplanning.TheEuropeanplanidentiﬁesextensions,whichaﬀect
transfercapabilitiesbetweenindividualTSOs,neededinadditiontowhattheTSOsare
planning for themselves. Supponen (2011) summarised the institutional interplay:
“ACERhastogiveanopiniononthetenyearnetworkdevelopmentplanandtoverify
thatthenationalplansarecoherentwiththeEuropeantenyearplan.Iftheyarenot,
ACERshallmakerecommendationstoamendeitherthenationalplanorthetenyear
plan.ENTSO-EandtheACERshallmonitortheimplementationoftheseplans”.Based
onthetenyearnetworkdevelopmentplan,anumberof‘projectsofcommoninterest’
(PCIs) are identiﬁed. These projects (i) are granted preferential treatment in order to
speed up the necessary authorisation process, (ii) are funded jointly by the TSOs
concerned (ACER can decide on a cost-distribution key if national regulators cannot
agree)and(iii)might–whentheConnectingEuropeFacilityisinplace–alsobeneﬁt
fromEuropeanco-ﬁnancing.
5.2.2Performance
Recentnetworkextension
WhiletheTSOforecastandtheEuropeanCommissionproposalbothforeseesigniﬁcant
growthintransmissioninvestment,networkdevelopmentsinthelastﬁveyearshave
atbesthadmixedresults(Figures19-21).Spainhasseenaboom(andbust)interms
ofextendingthesizeofitshigh-voltagenetwork,butGermaninvestmenthasremained
at its 2007 level for half a decade, and net transfer capacities with neighbouring
countries have not increased. Finally, France almost doubled investment in
transmission without extending the length of the network. In terms of international
transmissionlines,Franceincreasedthecapacityofthelinesfrom/toBelgium,Spain
andtoGermany,maintainedthecapacitiesfrom/toSwitzerland,EnglandandfromItaly
and reduced the capacities to Italy and from Germany. Overall, the total net transfer
capacityto(from)Franceslightlydecreasedby9percent(1percent)between2009
and2013.
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Table13:Changeinannualaveragenettransfercapacitybetween2009and2013
ImportfromFrance ExporttoFrance
Germany 21% -29%
England -6% -5%
Belgium 8% 19%
Spain 48% 31%
Italy -39% -2%
Switzerland -2% -2%
Source:RTE(https://clients.rte-france.com/lang/an/clients_producteurs/vie/ntc_annuelles.jsp).
Bycontrast,transmissioninvestmentisontheriseintheUnitedStatesandChina.In
China, in 2009 alone, 2078 km of ultra-high voltage transmission lines were added
and state investment in the power transmission system was €38.5 billion (Cheung,
2011). In the US, the recent increase in transmission investment is predicted to
continuefrom,currently,about€7billionperyearto€10.5billionperyear.Figure19:Lengthof22kVcircuitinkilometresattheendoftheyear
‘’’Source:ENTSO-E.Note:numbersinbracketsindicatechangeinlevelofinvestmentduringsampleperiod.*
Visegrad4=CzechRepublic,Hungary,PolandandSlovakia.
Figure20:Lengthof400kVcircuitinkilometresattheendoftheyear
Source:ENTSO-E.Note:numbersinbracketsindicatechangeinlevelofinvestmentduringsampleperiod.*Visegrad
4=CzechRepublic,Hungary,PolandandSlovakia.
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Policy performance
The EU Trans-European Energy Networks (TEN-E) funding programme started in the
mid-1990s to push the development of Europe’s energy infrastructure, in particular
the electricity and gas networks. It was believed that private interests alone were
enough to drive the projects forward with no need for strong EU intervention in the
implementationphases.Acontributionfortheinitialexploratoryphaseswasdeemed
suﬃcienttospeeduptheprocess.
Therefore, the TEN-E programme was established to facilitate the initial phases of a
project,namelyfeasibilitystudies.Sinceitdidnotneedtocoverimplementationcosts,
which make up the bulk of total project costs, the allocated budget for the TEN-E
programmewasalwayslowandaveragedaround€20millionannually.
Typically,aidwouldbegiventopartiallycoverthecostsofstudies,whichcouldthen
resultintheimplementationoftheprojectitself.However,onlyasmallpercentageof
Figure21:InvestmentsbyTSOsinelectricitynetworks,2006-12
Source:BNetzA,REE,RTE,Ofgem.Note:numbersinbracketsindicatechangeinlevelofinvestmentduringsample
period.
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implementationcostscouldbecoveredbyTEN-Efunding(Figure22).Inanycase,the
ﬁrst years of operation (before 2001) saw only two out of more than 50 projects
receive TEN-E funds for their implementation phases. The TEN-E programme
subsequentlychangedtoaccommodatetheneedformoreﬂexibleaid,andstartedto
focusincreasinglyonprojectsofcommoninterestandtheirimplementationphases.
The period 1996-2006 saw 354 applications for funding, of which 211 (60 percent)
wereapproved.Eachreceived€1.3milliononaverage.Theselectionwasabottom-up
process and left no space for the identiﬁcation of infrastructure gaps in a top-down
manner.
Ina2009reportevaluatingtheprogrammeintheperiod2000-06,76percentofthe
beneﬁciaries stated that the TEN-E co-funded studies provided little or no help in
facilitating the further co-ﬁnancing of the investment. Also, 78 percent of the
beneﬁciaries believed the study for which they received funding did not further the
investmentprojectinotherways.Additionally,almosttwothirdsofthememberstates
foundtheTEN-Einstrumentstobeinadequateinsteeringandguidingthedevelopment
oftheEuropeanenergystructure.Furthermore,evenif92.6percentofthestudiesthat
were funded between 2004-06 recommended implementation of the project
concerned,bytheendof2009,only48percenthadstarted,andonly8.7percentwere
completed.
Figure22:TEN-Efunding
Source:Bruegel.
Feasibility study Project
TEN-E
funding
Upto50%ofstudycost
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Finally,theselectionofprojectshasalsobeencriticised.Proostetal(2010)ﬁndthat
many projects do not pass the cost-beneﬁt test and only a few of the economically-
justiﬁableprojectswouldneedEuropeansubsidiestomakethemhappen.
Table14:TEN-Ebudget
in€million
Budget Allocated Allocatedyearly Averageallocation
TEN-E9599 90.20 18.04 0.79
TEN-E00-06 148.00 126.20 18.03 1.30
#Proposals Funded %funded
TEN-E9599 168 114 67.9%
TEN-E00-06 186 97 52.2%
Source:BruegelbasedonEuropeanCommission,2001,2004,2009and2010a.
The TEN-E programme aimed to act as a catalyst, and thus play an important role for
riskyprojectsandfeasibilitystudies.However,theapproachwasabottom-upselection
ofexistingprojects.TheabsenceintheTEN-Eprogrammeofatop-downapproachthat
couldpushforthedevelopmentofthemostimportantinfrastructureprojects,andthe
shift in focus towards a low-carbon energy system, led to the development of the
TYNDP(2010,2012).
TheEuropeanEnergyProgrammeforRecovery(EEPR)wasestablishedinmid-2009to
provideﬁnancialsupporttohighlystrategicprojectsintheenergysector.Itwascreated
not only as means to bolster the completion of the internal energy market and the
consequentreductioningreenhousegasemissions,butalsoasameanstostimulate
economicactivityandgrowthinatimeofcrisis.Theallocatedbudgetwasofabout€4
billion,ofwhichalmost60percentwasallocatedtoelectricityandgasnetworks.The
remaining funds were for oﬀshore wind and carbon capture and storage. To date, 12
electricityinfrastructureprojectshavebeenselectedandhavereceived€904million
(22.7percentofthetotalbudget),while17gasinterconnectionprojectshavereceived
€1285million54.AtthetimetheCommission’s2012reportontheEEPRwaswritten,30
percent of the projects had been completed, 41 percent were proceeding according
54. Source: Report of the commission on the implementation of the EEPR (2012), http://ec.europa.eu/
energy/eepr/doc/com_2012_0445_en.pdf.EVALUATINGTHECURRENTAPPROACH
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toscheduleandanother30percentwerebehindschedule.Giventhelongleadtimes
forinvestmentintheenergysector,thesubstantialsuccessrateoftheprojectsunder
theEEPRindicatesthatmanyofthemwerefundedwhenalreadymature.Itishence
not unlikely that a number of the projects would have proceeded without the EEPR
money.
Thetenyearnetworkdevelopmentplan(TYNDP)isoneofthemostambitiousprojects
for European network infrastructure. The plans imply, for the ﬁrst time, that the
Europeanlevelshouldbetakenintoconsiderationinnetworkplanning.Thequalityof
the plans increased signiﬁcantly between the pilot in 2010, which was merely a
collection of national plans, and the plan in 2012 that was based on some top-down
analysis. For 2014, ENTSO-E foresees a formal cost-beneﬁt analysis, the formal
consideration of projects proposed by parties other than the TSOs and a further
increaseinstakeholderinvolvement.
Sofar,duetothenon-bindingnatureoftheplan,itsactualimplementationhasbeen
mixed.Theevolutionofthestatusoftheindividualprojectsinthe2010planreported
inthe2012TYNDPindicatesthatabouthalfoftheprojectsaredelayed.Accordingto
this report only 52 percent of the projects proceed as planned, 28 percent are
postponed because of delays in the authorisation process, 6 percent are delayed
because generators rescheduled their plans and 13 percent are delayed for other
reasons.
5.2.3Ongoingprogress
TheEUhasidentiﬁedahugeinvestmentgapforenergyinfrastructure:€400billionfor
distribution networks, €140 billion for electricity transmission (€40 billion for smart
grids, €70 billion for interconnectors, €30 billion for oﬀshore connections) and €70
billion for gas transmission. Of the transmission investment, they estimate that €60
billionisnotcommerciallyviableand€40billionwillnotgetpermission.Toclosethis
gap,theCommissionproposedin2011theEnergyInfrastructurePackagethattargets
inparticularinvestmentsininterconnectors.
Thecorrespondingregulationonguidelinesfortrans-Europeanenergyinfrastructure55
wasadoptedbyParliamentandCouncilon17April2013.Theguidelinesdeﬁneasmall
number of trans-European priority corridors on which European action for energy
55. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:115:0039:01:EN:HTMLEVALUATINGTHECURRENTAPPROACH
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infrastructure should primarily focus. For electricity, four corridors are deﬁned56. The
Commissionwillidentifyprojectsofcommoninterestthatarenecessarytoimplement
the corridors. These projects will primarily beneﬁt from accelerated permit granting,
provisionsforcross-bordercost-sharingandpossiblyEUﬁnancialassistance.
Thetimetakentograntpermitsforprojectsofcommoninterestshouldbereducedto
lessthanthreeandahalfyearsbycreatingaone-stop-shoptomanagethepermitting
process,ensurepreferentialtreatmentinmemberstatesandincreasetransparency
andpublicparticipation.
To fund these projects of common interest, the regulation obliges the national
regulatorstograntsuﬃcientreturnsforthecorrespondingprojects.Probablythemost
importantprovisionintheregulationistheempowermentofACERtoenforceasharing
ofconstructioncostsbetweenthenationalregulatorsconcerned,incasetheyﬁndno
solutionthemselves.Finally,theregulationdeterminestheconditionsforeligibilityof
these projects for EU ﬁnancial assistance. EU funding for this regulation is to be
negotiatedinthecontextoftheConnectingEuropeFacilityﬁnancinginstrument.The
Commissionhasproposedthat€9.1billionbeallocatedtoenergyinfrastructureinthe
nextmultiannualﬁnancialframework(2014-2020).On8February2013theEuropean
Council agreed to reduce the amount to €5.1 billion. The European Parliament is
expectedtoﬁnallyapprovethisbudgetinautumn2013.
5.2.4Shortcomings
Theregulatedassetbase’modelhasprovedworkableinthenationalcontext.However,
intheinternationalorcross-bordercontextitfailsbecausebothdomesticandcross-
border transmission lines cause signiﬁcant spillovers onto neighbouring countries’
networksthatarenotproperlyconsideredbynationalregulatorsandTSOs.Themost
56. Northern Seas oﬀshore grid: integrated oﬀshore electricity grid development and the related interconnectors in
theNorthSea,theIrishSea,theEnglishChannel,theBalticSeaandneighbouringwaterstotransportelectricityfrom
renewableoﬀshoreenergysourcestocentresofconsumptionandstorageandtoincreasecross-borderelectricity
exchange.North-southelectricityinterconnectionsinwesternEurope:interconnectionsbetweenmemberstates
oftheregionandwiththeMediterraneanareaincludingtheIberianpeninsula,notablytointegrateelectricityfrom
renewable energy sources and reinforce internal grid infrastructures to foster market integration in the region.
North-southelectricityinterconnectionsincentral,easternandsoutheasternEurope:interconnectionsandinternal
lines in north-south and east-west directions to complete the internal market and integrate generation from
renewable energy sources. Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Plan for electricity: interconnections between
memberstatesintheBalticregionandreinforcinginternalgridinfrastructuresaccordingly,toendisolationofthe
BalticStatesandtofostermarketintegrationinteraliabyworkingtowardstheintegrationofrenewableenergyin
theregion.EVALUATINGTHECURRENTAPPROACH
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straightforwardproblemisthatthebeneﬁtofanewcross-borderlinemightconcentrate
in one country, while its cost mainly accrues in another. The regulator in the latter
countrywillnotbeinclinedtoapproveacorrespondinginvestmentplan.Theextreme
version of this case is that a domestic line in one country to reduce congestion in a
neighbouring country would never be approved by the ﬁrst country’s regulator. In
addition, cross-border lines – even though they have a net beneﬁt – might, for
example, shift welfare from consumers to producers within a country. If regulators
focusintheircost-beneﬁtanalysisonlyonconsumerwelfare,theymightbeinclined
toopposesuchprojects.Asaconsequence,networkdevelopmentbasedonnational
cost-beneﬁtanalysiswillnotdeliveraneﬃcientEuropeanelectricitynetwork.
CurrentEuropeanplanningandfundinglegislationandpracticewillnotdeliveratruly
Europeanelectricitynetwork,either.TheEuropeantenyearnetworkdevelopmentplan
isanon-bindingproposalbyENTSO-EtotheindividualTSOs.Astheplanisdeveloped
by the European transmission system owners and operators, it is likely to focus on
projects that are commercially viable for this segment of the industry, even though
other projects might be more sensible from a societal point of view. In addition, no
stakeholderislegallyaccountableiftheinformationittransmittedtoENTSO-E,onwhich
the European plan is based, subsequently proves wrong. Hence, the plan cannot
ensuresynchronisationoftheinvestmentdecisionsofdiﬀerentstakeholders.Thelack
of accountability for the accuracy of submitted information may allow individual
stakeholderstodistortorhideinformationinordertoinﬂuencetheoverallEuropean
plan. The non-binding nature also casts a degree of doubt over the credibility of the
European plan because it may allow individual TSOs to delay investments in certain
lines they are not particularly interested in. This uncertainty may discourage
generatorsfromcomingforwardwithinvestments,theproﬁtabilityofwhichdepends
on the realisation of certain lines. Finally, the technical planning and the resulting
selection of projects are not transparent. The model and major assumptions are not
disclosed. Consequently, challenging the set-up proposed by ENTSO-E is virtually
impossible.
The special permitting and funding rules for the projects of common interest – in
particular the right of ACER to enforce a compromise on cross-border cost sharing –
areabigstepinthedirectionofamoreEuropeannetworkinfrastructure.However,the
focusonalimitednumberofprojectsrisksignoringthesystemnatureofthemeshed
energy network. Consequently, the emphasis might be on building more border
crossings rather than investing in the most eﬃcient marginal improvements. In
addition, in order to satisfy private or public interests (eg for low or high prices), and
astheselectionisbasedonabottom-upprocess,onlylineswithlimitedimpactmightEVALUATINGTHECURRENTAPPROACH
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bebroughtforward.Finally,despitedetailedcriteria,theultimatechoiceofprojectsto
begranted‘commoninterest’statusmightnotbedrivenbyeﬃciencymotives,butby
therequirementtodisbursethescarceEUbudgetmoney‘fairly’.
Consequently,theinfrastructurepackageisunlikelytobeaﬁnalbreakthroughinthe
developmentofinfrastructureforthesingleEuropeanelectricitymarket.72
6Proposal
Building on our analysis, this section describes a ﬁrst-best solution for European
energy infrastructure investment to meet the EU’s energy policy objectives of
competitiveness,sustainabilityandsecurityofsupply.However,theﬁrst-bestsolution
faces political constraints. For example, any major reform that involves the
harmonisation of national schemes will have signiﬁcant redistributive eﬀects on
market participants. Some countries might even be worse-oﬀ when introducing a
solution that is preferable from the total-welfare perspective. This is ampliﬁed by
politicalconsiderationsanddiﬀerentpreferences.Thus,weexplorethefeaturesofa
feasiblesolutiontopromotetrulyEuropeanenergyinfrastructureinvestment.
6.1Aﬁrst-bestmarket-basedsolution
Comprehensiveelectricitymarketsarecomplex.Countriesandregionshavebeenable
tocomeupwithviableapproachesforusingexisting,andconstructingnew,partsof
the energy system (see Box 3). One ﬁrst-best market-based solution would consist
of:
1) A single regulator overseeing the development of the market design and
regulating the tariﬀs of the natural monopoly part of the business
(transmission system operator, transmission system owner, distribution
systemoperatorandowner)
2) Aregulatedindependentsystemoperatorthatoptimisesthedispatchofthe
existing units in a cost-minimising way through a transparent mechanism,
and that proposes network extensions based on a process that involves all
stakeholders.
3) Owners of the transmission system can chose whether they want to build
new lines according to the independent operator’s plans. If not, alternative
infrastructureprovidersmightcarryouttheprojectsonregulatedterms.
4) Aconsistentmarketdesignthatclearlyplacesresponsibilitiesonthediﬀerent
participants, creates the necessary interfaces between them and deﬁnes
products(forthediﬀerentcomponents)thatcanbetraded.PROPOSAL
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In the European context this would imply: European network planning, a single
Europeanmarketdesignforallaspects,aEuropeansystemoperatorandaEuropean
regulator.
BOX3:INTERNATIONALEXPERIENCE
TheUnitedStates’transmissionsystemsareoperatedthroughawidespectrumof
regional schemes. Some have sophisticated wholesale markets and independent
system operators (ISOs), while others possess neither. However, motivations for
transmission investment are largely the same as those in Europe: deployment of
intermittentrenewables(47GWofwindin2010),historicinvestmentbacklogand
regional integration within the US. However, the way the investment needs have
been addressed, and the levels of success in addressing them, diﬀers markedly
fromtheEU,andtheUShasbeenmoresuccessful.Intheperiod2007-11atotalof
16,000kmofnewlineswasinstalledandthevolumeofinvestmentisincreasing.
CaliforniaISO(CAISO)isoneexampleofasuccessfulUSmodel.CAISOisresponsible
for the operation and extension of a large portion of the California grid but the grid
hardwareitselfisownedbythetransmissionowners(TOs).
Funding: CAISO collects a regulator-approved transmission charge from all
consumers connected to the CAISO grid. It retains a grid management charge, and
redistributes revenues from the transmission access charge to participating TOs.
ThetariﬀsofTOsjoiningtheCAISOgridaretransitionedintoagrid-widetransmission
chargeovera10-yearperiod.CAISOrevenuesaredeterminedbytheregulator.
Operation:CAISOoptimisestheentireelectricitysystemcentrallybysettinghigher
prices in import-constrained parts of the network and lower prices in export-
constrainedparts.
Planning: CAISO has developed a formalised 23-month transmission planning
process,TEAM,whichattemptstoincorporateﬁvemainprinciplesintotheirplanning
studies: beneﬁt framework, full network representation, market prices, explicit
uncertainty analysis and interactions with other resources. TEAM includes a cost-
beneﬁt analysis of investment proposals which uses ﬂexible weighting of the
diﬀerent welfare components, allowing for the assessment of a proposal from the
perspectivesofdiﬀerentstakeholdergroups(Wuetal,2006).Theresultisaproject-
submission window in which transmission element proposals (both economicallyPROPOSAL
74
6.2Politicalchallenges
Aﬁrst-bestmarketdesignislikelytobepoliticallyunrealisticintheEuropeancontext
forthreereasons.First,thenecessarychangescomparedtothecurrentsituationare
substantialandwouldproducesigniﬁcantredistributiveeﬀects(seethenextsection).
Second, a European solution would deprive member states of the ability to manage
theirenergysystemsnationally.Andthird,asingleEuropeansolutionmightfallshort
ofbeingwell-tailoredtoconsumers’preferences,whichdiﬀersubstantiallyacrossthe
EU.
Redistributiveeﬀects
A single European market design would result in signiﬁcant redistributive eﬀects. If,
to give an illustrative example, Europe were to introduce the US standard market
design,allstakeholderswouldbeaﬀected.Thenationalpowerexchangeswouldlose
their role of traders for physical products and hence a major share of their current
business. The transmission system operators would be reduced to mere owners of
the physical infrastructure, while network extension planning and system operation
would be transferred to an independent agency. The support for newly installed
renewableswouldneedtobereorganised,possiblyinawaythatisbeneﬁcialforsome
regionswithfavourableresourcesandlessbeneﬁcialforotherregions.Consumersin
zoneswithlowpricesmightbefacedwithincreasingpriceswhenbetteroperationof
driven and policy-driven) are evaluated, and project sponsors are selected to
constructandowntheapprovedelements.
Theprocesshasbeenverysuccessfulinincentivisingtheconstructionofapproved
transmissionlines.Animpressive87percentofthetransmissionlinesapprovedin
2005 had been completed by 2009. Since 1999, transmission investment has
increased by 84 percent. A ratepayer organisation claims that this ‘success’
essentiallyrepresentsexcesstransmissionbeingfundedthroughincreasingtariﬀs
(since1999loadhasonlygrownby9percentinthattime).Theorganisationasserts
thatreasonable,andperhapseconomic,alternatives(somenon-infrastructure)are
not being considered. Indeed, the US Department of Energy has begun to look at
non-transmission alternatives. From a European perspective the possibility of the
oversupplyoftransmission,andthedevelopingdiscussionabouthowtoencourage
non-transmissionalternatives,areatestamenttothesuccessofmodelslikeCAISO
thatallowthediscoursetobeelevatedtoahigherlevel.PROPOSAL
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the network allows the export of more of ‘their’ cheap energy to other zones. And
ﬂexible generators might lose some of their value when demand response reduces
prices in situations of scarcity. Such redistributive eﬀects for stakeholders translate
intoredistributionbetweenmemberstates–aseachhasadiﬀerentelectricitysector
tostartwith.Aquantiﬁcationoftheseeﬀectsisstronglydependentonthedetailsof
theﬁnalmarketdesignandcanonlybeconductedbasedonsubstantialmodelling.But
togiveanexampleoftheorderofmagnitude,weevaluatetheimpactofahypothetical
Europeancapacitymechanism.Ifeverymemberstatewouldhavetoensurethatthe
remainingmarginoverthereliableavailablecapacityreachestheEuropeanaverageof
10percent(Figure23)byexchangingcapacitycredits,somememberstateswouldbe
signiﬁcantlybetteroﬀ,whileotherswouldhavetopay.
Figure23:Remainingmarginoverthereliableavailablecapacityfor2013
Source:ENTSO-E(2013).Note:Countriesshownarethoseforwhichdataisavailable.*UKdatadoesnotinclude
NorthernIreland.
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Atapriceof€100/MW-day57,theexistingFrenchover-capacitycouldgenerate–inour
purely illustrative example – capacity credits worth €140 million per year while
Germanywouldhavetobuycreditsworth€306million(Figure24).
57. ThisistheorderofmagnitudeobservedintheJMBaseResidualAuctionsin2013.
Figure24:GainsorlossesfromasimpleEuropeancapacitymechanismin€
millions
Source:BruegelbasedonENTSO-Eﬁguresonsystemadequacy.Note:Countriesshownarethoseforwhichdatais
available.*UKdatadoesnotincludeNorthernIreland.
-400
-300
-200
-100
0
100
200
300
A
u
s
t
r
i
a
B
e
l
g
i
u
m
B
u
l
g
a
r
i
a
C
z
e
c
h
R
e
p
u
b
l
i
c
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
D
e
n
m
a
r
k
E
s
t
o
n
i
a
S
p
a
i
n
F
i
n
l
a
n
d
F
r
a
n
c
e
U
n
i
t
e
d
K
i
n
g
d
o
m
*
G
r
e
e
c
e
C
r
o
a
t
i
a
H
u
n
g
a
r
y
I
r
e
l
a
n
d
I
c
e
l
a
n
d
I
t
a
l
y
L
i
t
h
u
a
n
i
a
L
u
x
e
m
b
o
u
r
g
L
a
t
v
i
a
Finally,institutionswillalsoopposethelossofthepowersthattheyhaveinthecurrent
system.Nationalandsometimesevensubnationalregulators,powerexchangesand
even the corresponding mainly national advisory, supervisory and research
institutions might perceive themselves to be vulnerable to such dramatic system
change.
P erceivedlossofsovereignt y
Inatrulysingleenergymarketthescopefornationalenergypoliciesissigniﬁcantly
reduced.Wheneconomicsignalsinharmonisedmarketsdriveinvestmentdecisions,PROPOSAL
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memberstateswillﬁnditdiﬃculttoensurethataparticular,politicallydesirable,fuel
mix materialises in their country. For example, a harmonised renewables scheme
might reduce the number of new solar panels in the north of Europe, while a pure
market framework for conventional investments might make new nuclear units un-
investableinEurope58.
Furthermore, using national market design choices to favour certain market
participantsforindustrialorsocialpolicyreasonsisnotpossibleinasinglemarket.For
example, artiﬁcially low network tariﬀs for customers connected to the high-voltage
network – typically energy-intensive customers – at the expense of other domestic
consumergroupswouldthenonlybepossibleinaharmonisedwayattheEuropean
level. Likewise, supporting solar panels through preferential network access and
exemptionfromobligationstoprovidesystemstabilisingservicescouldonlybeagreed
jointly. Finally, subsidising customers in supply-constrained areas by enforcing a
uniqueelectricitypricepercountrywouldbeincompatiblewiththeﬁrst-bestmarket
design.
Diﬀerentpreferences
Harmonising market designs might not only create winners and losers. It might also
ignoresigniﬁcantdiﬀerencesinthepreferencesofnationalconsumers.Oneillustrative
exampleissecurityofsupply.Somecountriesattachsigniﬁcantlyhighervaluetoan
uninterrupted electricity supply than others. One indication is that rich countries in
particular develop electricity systems with signiﬁcantly lower incidence of
interruptions than less wealthy EU countries (Figure 25). Hence, hard-wiring a one-
size-ﬁts-all level of security of supply runs the risk of not being appropriate for any
country.
58. SeeLévêque(2013).PROPOSAL
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59. ThissectiondrawsonZachmann(2013).
6.3Propertiesofafeasiblesolution
Theintegratedﬁrst-bestsolution–asingleEuropeansystemoperator,regulatedbya
single regulator, which develops the network in coordination with generators and
consumers–appearspoliticallyunrealisticbecauseoftheredistributiveeﬀects,the
loss of member-state sovereignty over ‘their’ electricity systems, the disregard for
certainnationalpreferencesandtheinstitutionalchangesitwouldinvolve59.
To nevertheless reap signiﬁcant beneﬁts from an integrated European electricity
market, we propose a blueprint for a European system to fund and incentivise
infrastructure development. The approach is fourfold: (1) implement vertical
unbundling;(2)addaEuropeansystem-managementlayer;(3)establishastringent
planningprocess;and(4)phase-inEuropeancost-sharing.
Figure25:Averageinterruptiontime(minutes/year)in2009-10
Source:CEER.
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Implementverticalunbundling
LéautierandThelen(2009)ﬁndthatverticalseparationisonekey-requirement(the
otherbeingawell-designedincentivescheme)forreducingnetworkcongestion.Itis
important that transmission system operators should not be concerned with the
interestsofaﬃliatedgenerators.Thelegalbasisforthishasalreadybeenadoptedin
the third EU energy sector liberalisation package of 2009. Implementation of the
unbundling requirements should have been done by 3 March 2012. The European
Commissionacknowledgesthatinmostmemberstatestheunbundlingprovisionsare
atthetimeofwritingnotfullytransposed.
AddaE ur opeansyst emmanagementlayer
Nationalsystemoperationcreatesmajorspilloversontoneighbouringcountries,but
also aﬀects network investment incentives. Uncoordinated system operation
increasestheincentivesfornationaloperatorstoclosetheirbordersinordertoensure
system stability. The straightforward way out of this dilemma is to add a European
system-management layer, in other words, centralising and monitoring electricity-
system information in real-time. This would enable throughput of electricity through
nationalandinternationallinestobesafelyincreasedwithoutanymajorinvestments
ininfrastructure.ThiswouldneitherrequireTSOstomergenortobeexpropriated,nor
would it signiﬁcantly infringe on national sovereignty over the security of national
electricitysystems.AEuropeancontrolcentrewouldcomplementnationaloperation
centresandhelpthemtobetterexchangeinformationaboutthestatusofthesystem,
expectedchangesandplannedmodiﬁcations.Theultimateaimshouldbetotransfer
theday-to-dayresponsibilityforthesafeandeconomicoperationofthesystemtothe
European control centre. To further increase eﬃciency, electricity prices should be
allowed to diﬀer between all network points across and within countries. That is,
electricity in Hamburg might be cheaper than in Munich on the wholesale market if
there is a lot of wind in the North Sea, while the sun is not shining on Bavarian solar
panels.Thiswouldprovidethecorrectincentivetoswitchoﬀcoal-ﬁredpowerplantsin
the north and switch on gas turbines in the south in order not to overcharge the
network.Inaddition,investorsingeneration(orload)willbasetheirlocationdecisions
ontheselocationalpricesignals.Thiswillreducecongestionovertimebycreatingan
incentiveforgeneration/loadtomovetonetelectricitydeﬁcit/surplusareas.PROPOSAL
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Establishastringentplanningprocess
Currentapproachestonetworkplanningsuﬀerfromanumberofshortcomings:they
essentially reﬂect the interests of TSOs, which make planning decisions without full
information about cross-border impacts; the plans are non-binding, meaning
stakeholders are not obliged to comply, and so do not provide the necessary
synchronisation of investments in the energy system; the planning process is non-
transparent as far as the modelling is concerned; and the planning process is
‘technocratic’inthesensethatitdoesnotaprioritaketheconcernsofresidentsinto
account.
Harmonising national network planning rules is administratively diﬃcult and would
takemanyyears.Toavoidthis,theEuropeanapproachistousethetenyearnetwork
development plan (TYNDP) to ensure the consistency of the results of national
planningwithEuropeanobjectives.Toachievethis,ACERmustprovideopinionsonthe
consistency of the individual national ten-year plans with the TYNDP. However, the
consistencyofnationalplanswithEuropeanobjectivescannotbeenforcedbyACER
ortheEU–Regulation714/2009explicitlyreferstothe“non-bindingCommunity-wide
ten-yearnetworkdevelopmentplan”.Hence,toensuretheconsistencyofindividual
national network plans and to ensure that they contribute to providing the
infrastructure for a functioning single market, the role of the TYNDP needs to be
upgraded.Thiscouldbedonebyobligingnationalregulatorstoonlyapproveprojects
plannedatEuropeanlevelunlesstheycanprovethatdeviationsarebeneﬁcial.
ThisboostedroleoftheTYNDPwouldneedtobeunderpinnedbyresolvingtheissues
of conﬂicting interests and information asymmetry. Two approaches to this are
conceivable: ﬁrst, relying on thorough cross-checking of ENTSO-E proposals by the
regulator,or,second,shiftingtheentireplanningprocesstoanindependentbody.
Intheﬁrstcase,ACERshouldberequestedandauthorisedtothoroughlycheckthatthe
TYNDPmaximisesthewelfareofcurrentandfutureEuropeancitizensandthatnational
plansareconsistentwiththeTYNDP.ThisimpliesthatACERwouldnotonlyrelyonthe
modellingresultsthatTSOsusetojustifytheirplans,butwouldhavetoolsofitsown
forimpartialevaluations.ACERshouldnotresorttoconsultingproprietarymodelsthat
are not fully disclosed and that have to be repeatedly procured. Instead, ACER – or
another public body – should invest in the capabilities to build, manage and use a
Europeanopen-sourceenergymodel.Basedonasubstantialupfrontinvestmentina
suitablemodel,ACERwouldstructureaprocessinwhichallrelevantstakeholderscan
supportACERbyupdatingtheassumptionsandthemodelling.IndividualstakeholdersPROPOSAL
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willstillhavebetterinformationontheirpartsoftheelectricitysystem.TSOswillknow
the network better than any independent network modeller, generators will have a
clearerviewoftheirindividualplans,largeconsumers(includingdistributionsystem
operators)willhavemoreinformationontheirfutureload,andresidentswillbestbe
abletoevaluatetheacceptabilityofproposedlines.Thereby,ACER’spowertoapprove
the TYNDP based on its own modelling results would shift the burden of proof to the
stakeholders(includingENTSO-E)incasetheydisagreewithACER’sconclusions.This
wouldgivethestakeholdersanincentivetodiscloseprivateinformation.Inaddition,
theopen-sourcenatureofthemodelwouldallowinconsistenciestobeidentiﬁed,and
improvements to be proposed. Of course, state-of-the-art could only be ensured by
continuedinvestmentinthemodel’scapabilities.
In the second case, resolving the issues of conﬂicting interests and information
asymmetryinnetworkplanningcouldalsobeachievedbybuildingonthesigniﬁcant
eﬀort that ENTSO-E has made in developing the TYNDPs. Using the TYNDP expertise
wouldrequirethatitsgovernancestructurebemadeindependentfromtheinterests
ofTSOs.Hence,adedicatedTYNDPgovernancestructureshouldbedevelopedthatis
representativeofallelectricitysectorstakeholders(inamembershipcommittee).An
executiveboardthatisindependentfromindustryinterestshouldhavefulloperational
control. Finally, the by-laws of the institution governing the TYNDP would need to
ensurethatthemodelusedforplanningismadefullytransparentandopensource.
Irrespective of the model chosen (‘cross-checking’ or ‘independent planning’), it is
essentialtomakeboththeinputfromstakeholdersandtheﬁnalplanbindinginorder
toimprovethesynchronisationofinvestment.Thatis,stakeholdersthat,forstrategic
or other reasons, deviate ex post from their predictions (eg building a power plant or
consuming electricity at a certain point of the network) will be liable to claims for
damagesfromotherstakeholders.
Finally,planningwillnotbeabletomakeallstakeholdersequallyhappy.Andcertain
choicesthatdonotaﬀectoverallwelfaremighthavesubstantialredistributiveeﬀects.
To rectify the distributional consequences, an ultimate political decision by the
European Parliament on the entire plan could open a negotiation process around
selectingalternativesandagreeingcompensation.Thisneedfordemocraticapproval
ensures that all stakeholders have an interest in ensuring a maximum degree of
balanceofinterestintheearlierstages.Infact,transparentplanning,earlystakeholder
involvementanddemocraticlegitimisationarewellsuitedforminimisingasmuchas
possiblelocaloppositiontonewlines.PROPOSAL
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ThedeliveryoftheplanwouldthenbelefttotheTSOsoranyotherinvestorwillingto
deliver individual lines according to the regulated conditions. In case of multiple
interests,thenationalregulatormightchoosethebestvalueoﬀer.
PhaseinEuropeancost-beneﬁtsharing
Cost and beneﬁt sharing is a critical element in the discussions about EU electricity
networks.Diﬀerentstakeholdershavediverginginterests,anditsoundsunnaturalto
requirestakeholderstopayforatransmissionlinethatactuallyreducestheirproﬁts.
Ontheotherhand,stakeholdersthatarethemajorbeneﬁciariesofanewlineshould
notbeabletopassallthecostontosociety.Hence,alleasilyattributablecostshould
beleviedontheresponsibleparty.Ifnewgenerationrequiresgridreinforcements,the
reinforcementsshouldbelargelypaidforbythegenerator(deepconnectioncharges).
Inthisway,theinvestorhastherightincentivestotrade-oﬀhighlocationalpricesin
one place (eg close to consumption centres), with cheap network access in another
place(eginazonewhereanoldpowerplanthasrecentlybeenshutdown),andgood
accesstoresourcesinathirdplace(egforawindturbine,azonewithhighconstant
wind).
Forallremainingnetworkextensionsthequestionishowtosharethecost60between
networkusersindiﬀerentregions.HavingalllineextensionsinSwedenbeingequally
ﬁnanced by Bulgarian network users seems diﬃcult. Having a Belgian line that is
requiredtoaccommodateloop-ﬂowscausedbyinner-Germanimbalancesbeingpaid
foronlybyBelgiannetworkusersisnotreasonableeither.
Basedontheassumptionthatthenetworkdevelopmentplanningprocessdiscussed
in the previous section delivers an eﬃcient proposal, and that new generators have
topaydeepconnectioncharges,wesuggestthatsomeredistributionisunavoidable.
The reason is that, so far, even the most sophisticated cost-beneﬁt analysis models
have been unable to identify the individual long-term net beneﬁt in an uncertain
environment.Forallinfrastructure(egrailandroad),thereissomesocialisationofthe
costs of individual projects within the diﬀerent regions of a country. Therefore, we
proposethatconsumersinallnodesthatareexpectedtoreceivemoreimportsthrough
60. Itwouldbesensibletoharmonisetheallocationofnetworkcoststodiﬀerenttypesofnetworkusers(consumer,
generator,storage)acrosscountries.AccordingtoBillettedeVillemeurandPineau(2012),tradebetweendiﬀerent
regimescanincreaseineﬃciency.Forexample,ifinsomecountriesonlyconsumershavetopaytheentirenetwork
costwhileinanother,allcostsarebornebythegenerators,moregeneratorswillmovetotheﬁrstcountryandmore
(industrial) consumers to the second country. Hence, more electricity will have to ﬂow between countries and
congestionislikelytoincrease.PROPOSAL
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a line extension should be obliged to pay a share of the line extension cost through
theirnetworkcharges,whiletherestofthecostissocialisedtoallconsumers61.Such
a cost-distribution scheme will involve some intra-European redistribution from the
well-developedcountries(infrastructure-wise)tothosethatarecatchingup.However,
such a scheme would perform this redistribution in a much more eﬃcient way than
theConnectingEuropeFacility’sad-hocdisbursementstopoliticallychosenprojects,
becauseitwouldprovidetheinfrastructurethatisreallyneeded.
6.4Conclusion
Implementationofthisproposalwilldelivertheinfrastructureneededtoachievethe
Europeanenergypolicytargetsintheﬁeldofelectricity.Itwillincreasethereliability
of the network, enable a truly borderless European electricity market, and facilitate
theintegrationofrenewables.IftheEUdecidestowaitfortheresultsofthenon-binding
plan to materialise in the 2020s, valuable time will have been lost. All approaches
involvingthrowingmoneyattheproblemtoachieveﬂagshipprojectswillfailtoresolve
the complex underlying issues. After three energy sector packages and 20 years of
work,theEUpossessesmanyofthekeyinstitutionsandlawsnecessaryforachieving
the single electricity market. In the past, the beneﬁts of a more coordinated system
havenotbeengreatenoughtooutweighthesigniﬁcantpoliticalandtransactioncosts
required to achieve such a system. However, recent developments (unbundling,
renewables, more trade) have substantially increased the value of greater
coordination. It is the right time for the EU to take a bold step towards a borderless
electricityinfrastructure.
61. Ifaharmonisationofnetworktariﬀsweretobeenvisaged,thissharemightalsobemadetime-variant.Forexample,
onemightstartwith100percentintheﬁrstyearandgoto90percentinthesecondyearandendwithzeropercent
inthetenthyear.84
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Table15:LiteratureSurvey
COMPETITION
Shanefelter(2008):Restructuringelectricitygeneration Depvar:ln(employment)
industryhasimprovedproductiveefficiency.In Indepvar:divestiture
particular,divestituresofgenerationassetshave %effect=-42.4%**
reducedemploymentandaggregatepayroll
expenses. Depvar:ln(payroll)
Indepvar:divestiture
%effect=-32.3%**
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consolidatingelectricitymarketshaveledtoan Indepvar:divestiture%effect=10.4%**
increaseinoperatingefficiency,achievedprimarily
byreducingthefrequencyanddurationofreactor Depvar:Post-divestituregainsIndepvar:
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regulatoryrestructuringactivityincertainstatesis coefficient(gas)=-5.65***
associatedwithimprovementsinplantoperating - numberofplantsundermgntoftheutility
performance coefficient(coal)=-0.07***
coefficient(gas)=-0.06***
Zarnic(2010a):Europeanelectricitymarketreforms Depvar:SolowResidualsIndepvar:
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Howeverthesearenotuniformlydistributed;the coefficient=-0.004***
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associatedwithbetterfunctioningofwholesaleand subsidiaries)Indepvar:
retailmarkets.Theannualdecreaseinvertical - Effectofliberalisationcoefficient=-0.018**
integrationnegativelyaffectsthemark-upsof - Effectofcross-borderarbitrage
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Gerbauletetal(2012):Thepaperexaminesfour TotalSystemCostpermonth(approximations):
scenariosofdifferenttertiaryreservemarket 1. National:€85million
cooperation;resultsarepromisingtoloweroverall 2. Bilateral(GermanyandAustria):
systemcostsbyabout10%inthecaseofoneunified €79million
tertiaryreservemarketcalled‘Germalpina’,which 3. Bilateral(GermanyandSwitzerland):
seemstobepreferableoverthebilateralcoalitions. €77million
Inthescenariooffullintegrationre-dispatchcosts 4. Germalpina:€75million
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1. National:€2.1million
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€100million/year
-1 5 %TotalInterconnectionCapacity:
€90million/year
Haucap etal(2012):Inrecentyears,anewmarket Savingsfor46month:
designwascreatedbysynchronizationandinter- - MarketforincrementalMRP
connectionofthefourcontrolareasofGermanreserve - €1948million
powermarket.Thepaperfindsthatreformswerejointly - MarketfordecrementalMRP€1400million
successfulindecreasingMRPpricesleadingtosubstantial
costsavingsforthetransmissionsystemoperators.
MansurandWhite(2012):Electricitymarketsexhibit Gainsfromtrade($million/year)
twoformsoforganisation:decentralisedbilateral - Bilateralmarketpost10/2004
tradingandcentralisedauctionmarkets.Theempirical (counterfactual)=150.1
evidenceindicatesthatemployinganorganised - Organisedmarketpost10/2004
marketdesignsubstantiallyimprovedoverallmarket (estimate)=312.9
efficiency,andthattheseefficiencygainsfar - Changeingainsfromtrade
exceededimplementationcosts. ($million/year)=162.8
Implementationcosts(one-time)
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